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Case Notes
TORTS-JOINT ENTERPRISE DOCTRINE-A Flying School/Air-
craft Owner Is Engaged in a Joint Enterprise with its Student Pilots
and Is Vicariously Liable for the Student's Negligent Acts. Alle-
gheny Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 504 F.2d 104 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3614 (1975).
On September 9, 1969, Robert W. Carey, a student pilot flying
a solo cross-country flight in a plane owned by the operator of the
flight school in which he was enrolled, collided with an Allegheny
Airlines plane near Fairland, Indiana, destroying both aircraft and
killing Carey, the crew of the Allegheny aircraft, and all 78 passen-
gers.' Allegheny Airlines, Inc. and G.E.C.C. Leasing Corporation
brought suit seeking recovery of damages sustained by their aircraft
and engine, and named Forth Corporation, owner of the airplane
and operator of the flying school, as a defendant. The trial court,
in holding for the defendants, determined that Allegheny Airlines
was contributorily negligent in the operation of its aircraft and
that neither joint enterprise nor statutory vicarious liability were
applicable. The defendants appealed the trial court's decision to
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Held, reversed: A flying
school/aircraft owner is engaged in a joint enterprise with its stu-
dent pilots and is vicariously liable for the student's negligent acts.
Imputed negligence has been with the law for many years. Wheth-
er called vicarious liability or imputed contributory negligence, the
terms used to characterize the parties' relationship, agency, joint
enterprise (a type of agency),' master/servant relations,' and "ultra-
'1970 NTSB REP. AAR-70-15.
2 Prosser defines joint enterprise in the following way:
A "joint enterprise" is something like a partnership, for a more
limited period of time, and a more limited purpose. It is an under-
taking to carry out a small number of acts or objectives, which is
entered into by associates under such circumstances that all have
an equal voice in directing the conduct of the enterprise. The law
then considers that each is the agent or servant of the others, and
that the act of any one within the scope of the enterprise is to be
charged vicariously against the rest. Whether such a relation exists
between the parties is normally a question for the jury, under
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hazardous" activity, are familiar legal "fictions" which have allowed
the shifting or spreading of liability for the negligent activity from
the actual tortfeasor to another party. Courts, supported by public
policy arguments, developed these legal fictions to enable recovery
by injured parties against the financially responsible principal,
rather than effectively denying recovery by forcing personal judg-
ments against the agent.4
The logical extension of vicarious liability into aviation has
been premised upon the same "deep pockets" reasoning found in
the development of vicarious liability in other tort areas. Just as
the automobile owner is likely to be more able than the driver to
bear the financial responsibility for the negligence of the driver on
the owner's business, so the aircraft owner would seem more capa-
ble of paying a judgment than the pilot of the plane.' As exempli-
fied by the amount of the claim in Allegheny,' damages sought for
air crash-related, tortious acts usually exceed the resources of the
estate of a negligent pilot.
Adopting this reasoning from past non-aviation tort cases,
courts have developed the principle that the vicarious liability of an
proper instructions from the court.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 72 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER].
See generally PROSSER 55 69-74.
4 Id.
5 Current public policy considerations for vicarious liability are reflected by
Prosser:
What has emerged as the modern justification for vicarious liability
is a rule of policy, a deliberate allocation of a risk. The losses
caused by the torts of the employees, which as a practical matter
are sure to occur in the conduct of the employer's enterprise, are
placed upon that enterprise itself, as a required cost of doing busi-
ness. They are placed upon the employer because, having engaged
in an enterprise which will, on the bais of all past experience, in-
volve harm to others through the torts of employees, and sought
to profit by it, it is just that he, rather than the innocent injured
plaintiff, should bear them; and because he is better able to absorb
them, and to distribute them, through prices, rates or liability in-
surance, to the public, and so shift them to society, to the com-
munity at large.
PROSSER at 459.
6504 F.2d 104, 106-07 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3614
(May 19, 1975). Allegheny Airlines claimed against Forth Corporation for the
value of its aircraft, $3,750,000. G.E.C.C. Leasing Corporation's claim was for
$250,000, the value of one turbojet engine leased to Allegheny which was de-
stroyed in the crash.
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aircraft owner for the actions of the pilot of that aircraft is depend-
ent upon the existence of either a master/servant, bailor/bailee,
or principal/agent relationship between the owner and pilot.! Un-
fortunately, the judicial characterization of a flying school/student
pilot situation into either master/servant, bailor/bailee, or princi-
pal/agent categories, although financially expedient, would require
judicial fact-invention. Usually, a student pilot is neither bailee,
agent, nor servant to the flying school; he is more often a customer,
purchasing the services of an instructor. Reflecting dissatisfaction
with the employment of either legal fictions or judicial fact-inven-
tion to find the requisite elements of such fictions, many courts have
denounced these methods of imputing negligence to an aircraft
owner.'
Because of the dissatisfaction with the inherent incongruities ne-
cessarily a part of the legal "fictions," Congress and the state legis-
latures formulated statutory vicarious liability provisions with vary-
ing degrees of success. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (the Act)
provides that:
"Operation of aircraft" or "Operate aircraft" means the use of air-
craft, for the purpose of air navigation and includes the navigation
of aircraft. Any person who causes or authorizes the operation of
aircraft, whether with or without the right of legal control (in the
7 D'Aquilla v. Pryor, 122 F. Supp. 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). For similar holdings
in non-aviation cases see Hays v. Morgan, 221 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1955); Pierce
v. Horvath, 143 Ind. App. 278, 233 N.E.2d 811 (1968).
8 Broyles v. Jess, 201 Cal. App. 2d 841, 20 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1962); Boyd v.
White, 128 Cal. App. 2d 641, 276 P.2d 92 (1954); Johnson v. Central Aviation
Corp., 103 Cal. App. 2d 102, 229 P.2d 114 (1951); Ross v. Apple, 143 Ind.
App. 357, 240 N.E.2d 825 (1968), reh. den., 241 N.E.2d 872 (1968); Haskin
v. Northeast Airways, Inc., 266 Minn. 210, 123 N.W.2d 81 (1963). Where not
even the greatest stretch of the judicial imagination could cover the distance be-
tween reality and a fictional agency, the use of an airplane has occasionally, like
the use of an automobile, been considered "ultrahazardous" and the owner has
been held liable for the damage caused by its improper use, whether he was
present or not. It would seem highly improbable that flying, any more than auto-
mobile operation, should continue to bear the label of "ultrahazardous." Surpris-
ingly, some courts continue to resort to the theory that an airplane is a dangerous
instrumentality, and this theory persists in the American Law Institute's Restate-
ment of the Law of Torts. Florida regards the airplane as ultrahazardous. Orefice
v. Albert, 237 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1970). The use of such an anachronistic device
is, however, dying and the great majority of courts have expressly refused to con-
sider the airplane ultrahazardous any longer. D'Aquilla v. Pryor, 122 F. Supp.
346 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Boyd v. White, 128 Cal. App. 2d 641, 276 P.2d 92 (1954);
Johnson v. Central Aviation Corp., 103 Cal. App. 2d 102, 229 P.2d 114 (1951);
Wood v. United Air Lines, Inc., 32 Misc. 2d 955, 223 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1962).
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capacity of owner, lessee, or otherwise) of the aircraft, shall be
deemed to be engaged in the operation of aircraft within the mean-
ing of this chapter.!
This language or very similar language has been adopted by eigh-
teen states in their own statutes," in an attempt to resolve the prob-
lems concomitant with common law vicarious liability. Federal and
state courts have, however, had difficulty deciding whether these
statutes create or imply a civil remedy against the aircraft owner
for third parties injured through the negligence of a pilot who does
not own the aircraft he flies."
After enactment of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, but before
the incorporation by states of similar statutory language, many liti-
gants sought a federal forum for their actions. In one such case,
Moungey v. Brandt," the District Court of the Western District of
Wisconsin refused to grant a federal remedy without finding com-
pelling national interest, inadequate state or administrative remedy,
and that the plaintiff was in a class protected by the statute. The
Moungey court's reaction was foreseeable if the approval of the
remedy had been viewed as opening the door to plaintiffs seeking
statutory vicarious liability in federal courts. The federal forum had
9 49 U.S.C. 5 1301 (26) (1970).
"
0 CODE OF ALA. TIT. 4, § 20(25) (1940); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 15-34(20)
(1972); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 2 § 501 (1974); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 15 , 55 22.11,
22.42a-42o (1963); IND. CODE § 8-21-3-1(h) (1971); IOWA CODE § 328.1(14)
(1946); Ky. REV. STAT. § 183.011(16) (1970); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 6 S
3(24) (1964); MAss. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, 55 35(j), 49B-49R (1975); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 259.22 (1967); MINN. STAT. 5 360.013(10) (1966); Miss. CODE
§ 61-1-3(j) (1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 1-102(10), as amended, (Supp.
1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 3-101(11) (1970); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. S 422:3(23)
(1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 63-1(16) (Supp. 1974); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 251
(McKinney 1968); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 5, § 2(20) (1972).
11 Courts have refused to imply vicarious liability from state or federal statu-
tory language in McCord v. Dixie Aviation Corp., 450 F.2d 1129 (10th
Cir. 1971); Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Service, Inc., 435 F.2d 1389 (5th
Cir. 1970); Rosdail v. Western Aviation, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 681 (D.C. Colo.
1969); Yelinek v. Worley, 284 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Va. 1968); Moungey v.
Brandt, 250 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Wis. 1966); Moody v. McDaniel, 190 F. Supp.
24 (N.D. Miss. 1960); Nachsin v. De La Bretonne, Inc., 17 Cal. App. 3d 637,
95 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1971); Ferrari v. Byerly Aviation, Inc., 131 Ill. App. 2d 747,
268 N.E.2d 558 (1971); Guillen v. Williams, 27 Misc. 2d 575, 212 N.Y.S.2d 556
(1961). Courts have implied vicarious liability from similar or identical language
in Hays v. Morgan, 221 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1955); Sosa v. Young Flying Service,
277 F. Supp. 554 (S.D. Tex. 1967); Lamasters v. Snodgrass, 248 Iowa 1377, 85
N.W.2d 622 (1957); Hoebee v. Howe, 98 N.H. 168, 97 A.2d 223 (1953).
12 250 F. Supp. 445, 451 (W.D. Wis. 1966).
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been available to vicarious liability claims in previous years ' be-
cause of the willingness of some courts to imply a civil remedy."'
Some state courts encouraged imputing negligence to the aircraft
owner because of the owner's ability to ". . . spread the risk through
insurance and carry the cost thereof as part of [the] costs of doing
business."1 Statutory vicarious liability on the state level may have
the effect of easing the blind rush into federal court, especially when
finding vicarious liability based on the Act has proven so uncer-
tain.
At least some state courts have been willing to impute the pi-
lot's negligence to the aircraft owner on the basis of state statutory
language similar to that contained in the Federal Aviation Act of
1958." The most notable example of state implication of liability is
a New Hampshire case, Hoebee v. Howe." In Hoebee, the relevant
statute was identical to the Federal Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,8
the predecessor to the present Act. Justice Blandin considered leg-
islative history and fashioned his opinion along those lines:
It seems to us from reading our act that the intent of our Legislature
is clearly to place responsibility on the owner, even though he be
without control, for the conduct of one to whom he entrusts the
plane.1"
In a similar interpretation of an Iowa statute, the Iowa Supreme
Court in Lamasters v. Snodgrass" held the aircraft owner vicarious-
ly liable under code language virtually identical to that of the Act
1 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 499 (2d
Cir. 1956); Moody v. McDaniel, 190 F. Supp. 24 (N.D. Miss. 1960).
14 See note 11 supra.
15 Johnston v. Long, 300 Cal. 2d 54, -, 181 P.2d 645, 651 (1947) (Traynor,
J.).
18 Lamasters v. Snodgrass, 248 Iowa 1377, 85 N.W.2d 622 (1957); Hoebee v.
Howe, 98 N.H. 168, 97 A.2d 223 (1953).
1798 N.H. 168, 97 A.2d 223 (1953).
18 The Federal Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 provided:
Any person who causes or authorizes the operation of aircraft,
whether with or without the right of legal control (in the capacity
of owner, lessee, or otherwise) of the aircraft, shall be deemed to
be engaged in the operation of aircraft within the meaning of this
chapter.
Federal Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 1, 52 Stat. 973 (now Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, § 101).
19 98 N.H. 168, -, 97 A.2d 223, 225 (1953).
" 248 Iowa 1377, 85 N.W.2d 622 (1957).
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of 1958.1 Although state courts have also interpreted their respec-
tive statutes as implying no vicarious liability," the strong precedent
of Hoebee lends weight to any subsequent state imposition of statu-
torily imputed negligence. Indeed, federal court denial of statutory
vicarious liability would not serve to discredit state approbation of
similar language, and a federal court decision imposing liability
under the Act could be taken as tacit approval of state courts' simi-
lar treatment of their own statutes.
The application of statutory vicarious liability might have fore-
closed the result adopted in Allegheny had the intent of the various
legislatures been consistently interpreted.' But, like others before it,
the Allegheny court did not base its decision on statutory grounds
alone. The court relied heavily on common law, reflecting a distrust
of statutory resolution. This return to the common law has revital-
ized agency theories, including joint enterprise and its basic defi-
nition.'
Joint enterprise is but one of the common law approaches to vi-
carious liability, the existence of which is premised in large part
upon the existence of a unique relationship between the parties in-
volved giving rise to a mutual duty. Because the underlying basis
for imputing liability to one party for the negligence of another lies
in this mutual duty, the relationship is analogous to partnership.'
The fiction thus evolved from the pseudo-agency interaction of the
participants has been most singular in its application.
The most common employment of joint enterprise is in auto-
mobile settings, but it has been limited even within that context.
Relatively few courts have attempted to impute the negligence of
the driver to his passenger."1 Although the doctrine seems particu-
21 Id. at -, 85 N.W.2d at 626.
22 Ferrari v. Byerly Aviation, Inc., 131 Ill. App. 2d 747, 268 N.E.2d 558
(1971); Guillen v. Williams, 27 Misc. 2d 575, 212 N.Y.S.2d 556 (1961).
23Aviation cases dealing with statutory vicarious liability have often based
their decisions in large part on legislative intent. See, e.g., Yelinik v. Worley, 284
F. Supp. 679, 681 (E.D. Va. 1968); Hoebee v. Howe, 98 N.H. 168, -, 97 A.2d
223, 225 (1953).
24 Compare Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 504 F.2d 104 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3614 (May 19, 1975) (using the majority defini-
tion of joint enterprise) with Shoemaker v. Whistler, 513 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1974)
(using the Restatement definition of joint enterprise).
See note 2 supra.
20 Manley v. Horton, 414 S.W.2d 254 (Mo. 1967); Straffus v. Barclay, 147
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larly suited for that purpose, more often, the negligent driver has
raised joint enterprise as a bar to recovery by the passenger." The
restricted application of joint enterprise in this largest area of its
use is sharply contrasted by the claim of the plaintiffs in Allegheny
that the financially secure but absent "passenger" could be reached
through the negligent pilot. The dormant possibilities of joint enter-
prise as a vehicle for recovery against the aircraft owner began to
stir to life under the understanding tutelage of an imaginative plain-
tiff's attorney. Nor did the court consign that attempt to its historical
resting place, but looked upon the invocation of such an unusual, if
obvious, adhibition with apparent favor.
The definition of joint enterprise used by the Allegheny court is
that adopted by a majority of jurisdictions."' Its basic elements are
a community of interest in the object and purpose of the undertak-
ing, an equal right to direct and govern the conduct of the opera-
tion, and a contract, either expressed or implied. '
Tex. 600, 219 S.W.2d 65 (1949); Jones v. Kasper, 109 Ind. App. 465, 33 N.E.2d
816 (1941); Ahlstedt v. Smith, 130 Neb. 372, 264 N.W. 889 (1936); Fox v.
Lavender, 89 Utah 115, 56 P.2d 1049 (1936).
27 The use of joint enterprise as a bar to recovery is reflected in PROSSER:
In by far the greater number of cases, the question has been one
of contributory negligence, and the driver's misconduct has been
imputed to the passenger to bar his own recovery. 'Joint enterprise'
is thus of importance chiefly as a defendant's doctrine, imputing
the negligence of another to the plaintiff; and as such, it has not
been slow to draw the wrath of the plaintiff's partisans.
PROSSER at 476.
21 PROSSER at 477. This definition of joint enterprise is commonly applied,
although it differs in one material term from that proposed by the American
Law Institute. The Restatement definition requires, additionally, a community
of pecuniary interest in the common purpose.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 491, comment c (1965):
The elements which are essential to a joint enterprise are commonly
stated to be four: (1) an agreement express or implied, among
the members of the group; (2) a common purpose to be carried
out by the group; (3) a community of pecuniary interest in that
purpose, among the members; and (4) an equal right to a voice in
the direction of the enterprise, which gives an equal right of control.
"The court obtained these elements from Jones v. Hernandez, 148 Ind. App.
17, 263 N.E.2d 759 (1970). The court's use of this particular case for its defini-
tion of joint enterprise is somewhat incongruous in its factual setting. Jones
dealt with joint enterprise in a non-vehicular context, deriving its definition of
joint enterprise from Keck v. Pozorski, 135 Ind. App. 192, 191 N.E.2d 325
(1963), an automobile case. This mixed factual application of a common defini-
tion suggests that the Allegheny court could not or would not discern any appre-
ciable difference in the elements of joint enterprise, whether used in an auto-
motive, non-automotive, or aviation case.
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The Allegheny court found the first requisite element of joint en-
terprise by considering that the student and the flying school were
engaged in a project with a "community of interest" in obtaining a
pilot's license for Carey." The court held that, while Carey's interest
in obtaining such a license was obvious, the school also had a vested
interest in the venture in that it hoped to realize additional business
from Carey as a pilot and other potential pilots who might be drawn
to the school for training." The flying school and student would,
under the court's approach, always have this community of interest
because both are economically and objectively concerned with ob-
taining a goal that is important to each of them, notwithstanding the
fact that the goal is pursued for different reasons. The majority of
American courts, in traditional non-aviation cases, have, however,
not allowed the common use of a vehicle to meet the community of
interest requirement." Nor has joint enterprise liability been applied
when the parties involved had independent goals.' Apparently, the
Allegheny court disregarded these prior cases in favor of a new con-
cept of community of interest.
30 504 F.2d at 114.
3' 504 F.2d at 114. In finding a community of interest, the court said,
As to the "community of interest in the object or purpose" require-
ment, both Carey and Forth were seeking the common objective
of obtaining a private pilot's license for Carey. Carey's interest was
obvious, his personal convenience and to satisfy his desire to learn
to fly. Forth's interest in Carey's success was reflected in the addi-
tional business to be derived from Carey as a pilot and other po-
tential pilots who might be drawn to Brookside for training. Id.
32 Pope v. Halpern, 193 Cal. 168, 223 P. 470 (1924); Bryant v. Pacific Elec.
R. Co., 174 Cal. 737, 164 P. 385 (1917); Coleman v. Bent, 100 Conn. 527,
124 A. 224 (1924). Prosser describes the trend away from such broad definition:
One group of cases, now definitely very much in the minority and
almost passing out of the picture, have found a joint enterprise
in the mere association of the driver and the passenger in the use
of the vehicle for any purpose in which they have a common in-
terest of any kind.
PROSSER at 477.
3 Kepler v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. R. Co., 111 Neb. 273, 196 N.W. 161
(1923) (passenger driven as accommodation to mail letters); Hilton v. Blose,
297 Pa. 458, 147 A. 100 (1929) (on way to bowl on different teams in different
games); Conner v. Southland Corp., 240 So. 2d 822 (Fla. App. 1970) (going
to work for same employer on different jobs); Kuser v. Barengo, 70 Nev. 66,
254 P.2d 447 (1953) (delegates to convention).
34 In its opinion, the court cited no authority for its position in finding a
community of interest in the purpose. Apparently, the court assumed that the
logic of its position was so compelling as to invite no discussion, but when con-
sidered in the context of automobile joint enterprise cases, the consequences of
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Community of interest in the purpose of the venture can be
found in a flying school/student relationship only through a con-
siderable broadening of the bounds of previous definition.' The
court's opinion recognized a dichotomy of interest in the purpose
seen by Forth Corporation and that seen by Carey," but described a
most tenuous connection, the desire of the school and the student
to license Carey, as sufficient to form the necessary "community" of
interest." Such a conclusion seems a reversion to the factual fictions
disdained by courts in the previous vicarious liability situations."
Virtually any fact setting involving two persons doing business
could adapt to meet the requirements for "community of interest"
if the Allegheny court's emasculation of that requirement finds
wide acceptance."
Automobile joint enterprise precedent was inapplicable in de-
ciding whether the parties in Allegheny met the second joint enter-
prise requirement, an equal right to direct and govern the conduct
of the operation. In the joint enterprise cases involving automobiles,
both parties to the enterprise were present at the time of the tortious
act."0 The Allegheny court, however, unequivocally renounced a
requirement of joint presence at the time of the wrongdoing because
of the hazardous nature of the undertaking and Carey's status as a
such an obvious broadening of the definition of joint enterprise seem momentous
and certainly worthy of further explanation.
" The "community of interest in the object or purpose" of flying lessons is
likely to be nonexistent. The flying school, realistically, is interested in the pe-
cuniary aspects of its business, whether with regard to the tuition paid by the
student or the desire for future business. The student is interested in learning to
fly and receiving the required license, for whatever his personal reasons. It is a
broad generalization to state that any common incidental interest fulfills the
requirement for this element of joint enterprise. If joint enterprise is to remain
a viable means of imputing negligence, it must retain a more narrow focus than
the Allegheny court allowed, or be used to turn the most casual relationships into
situations of potential liability.
" See note 31 supra.
37 504 F.2d at 114.
38 PROSSER at 459.
To date there appears no case so broad in its acceptance of "community of
interest" standards as Allegheny. Because the court held a prima facie case of
joint enterprise had been established when it could have held defendant liable
without joint enterprise application, the possibility exists that this case is to be
interpreted as applying only to aviation cases in a narrow factual setting.
"
0 PROSSER at 478-80.
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student pilot." The court reasoned that mutual control did exist:
Carey had control over the goal of obtaining his license, and was in
physical control of the aircraft at the time of the collision. Forth
Corporation had control over Carey as his instructor and had an af-
firmative obligation under federal air regulations to supervise and
control all facets of Carey's training.' In most automobile joint en-
terprise cases, the passenger need not have a right to take physical
control, but must have a right to direct the manner in which the ve-
hicle is driven. ' The Allegheny court concluded that the parties
did have an equal voice in controlling the aircraft's flight, even with-
out the physical presence of the instructor/owner, and that such mu-
tual control extended to the common objective of obtaining Carey's
private pilot's license."
41405 F.2d at 114. The court said,
Moreover, in view of the hazardous nature of Carey's undertaking
and his status as a student pilot, we reject any notion which urges
that equal control can be established only by a showing of joint
presence of the parties at the time of the alleged wrongdoing. Id.
The precise meaning of the court's statement is unclear. No authority for this
conclusion was cited by the court and the position is apparently unique in aviation
cases. The court's reference to the hazardous nature of the undertaking raises
questions concerning the possible application of "ultrahazardous" vicarious liability
reasoning by the court. Although a holding that flying is ultrahazardous would
be anachronistic, it would be more in consonance with precedent than inferring
that the element of mutual control may be assumed under hazardous conditions.
Indeed, applied to an automobile setting, this theory would allow the mutual
control requirement to be met when a solitary driver assumed control of the
automobile under dangerous road conditions or while that driver is inexperienced.
Such a connotation produces difficult questions concerning how much experience
is necessary and what conditions are safe enough to overcome the presumption
of mutual control. For a discussion of "ultrahazardous" precedents see note 8
supra.
4' The court said,
Carey had control over the goal of obtaining his private pilot's
license in that he alone had the power to determine his rate of
progress by the frequency and timing of his flying. Forth had con-
trol over Carey which emanated from the instructor-student rela-
tionship. In addition, Forth was under an affirmative obligation
under the federal air regulations to supervise and control all facets
of Carey's training.
504 F.2d at 114.
'Pope v. Halpern, 193 Cal. 168, 223 P. 470 (1924); Churchill v. Briggs,
225 Iowa 1187, 282 N.W. 280 (1938); Carroll v. Hutchinson, 172 Va. 43, 200
S.E. 644 (1939). Prosser summarizes such a relationship by saying, "It is not
the fact that he does or does not give directions which is important in itself,
but rather the understanding between the parties that he has the right to have
his wishes respected, to the same extent as the driver." PROSSER at 479-80.
44504 F.2d at 114. The requirement for mutual control was found by the
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The court easily found the final element of contract.' The very
basis of the relationship between a flying school, such as Forth Cor-
poration, and a student like Carey usually initiates with an express
written contract, and may contain additional implied contractual
terms.
The Allegheny court was not the first to deal with vicarious lia-
bility for the aircraft owner."" In Herrick v. Curtiss Flying Service,
Inc.,' it was held that without reference to servant and master or
principal and agent, liability could be imposed on the owner of the
airplane for a collision occurring while the plane was in the control
of a student pilot to whom it had been rented." Unlike the court in
Allegheny, the Herrick court did not discuss the possibility of joint
enterprise, but the court noted that something beyond the available
legal fictions was necessary to hold owners vicariously liable."
As demonstrated by ample statutory history, the desirability of re-
placing the usual common law approaches to vicarious liability has
been accepted for some time, even though the success of such leg-
islative measures has been very limited. "' Common law vagaries and
court, although the absence of any agent of Forth Corporation in the aircraft
makes the position difficult at best. Although the court does not mention such
a possibility, the finding of mutual control may rest in part on the distinct facts
of this case. The absolute necessity of allowing a student to fly solo; increased
control of the aircraft by ground personnel using radio; and the omnipresent
federal air regulations contribute to a sense that no pilot, and particularly no stu-
dent pilot, flies completely alone. Enhancing this view is the accepted position
that mutual right of control is the required element, not mutual physical con-
trol. If a doubt exists as to whether the parties have agreed to shared control,
the question becomes one for the jury.
41504 F.2d at 114.
41 Typically, flying schools and students enter into written contracts expressing
financial arrangements and liability of the parties. It should not be assumed
that every such contract would supply the requisite contractual relationship
necessary for joint enterprise. Although the element of contract has seldom been
discussed in detail, the contract should logically relate to the purpose of the en-
terprise. A contract only for financial arrangements between the school and stu-
dent does not go to the purpose of the venture or liability, and might be said
to have nothing to do with the joint enterprise. Use of implied contractual agree-
ments would usually supply the element in any event, but whether any contract
will suffice has not been directly decided.
" See note 11 supra.
"1 1932 U.S. Av. 110 (N.Y.).
49Id. at 125,
501d. at 122-25.
51 As early as 1939, the National Conference of Commisioners on Uniform
State Laws adopted a Uniform Aviation Liability Act which provided for strict
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inconsistent statutory usage indicate general dissatisfaction with the
legal results compelled by case precedent and code interpretation. A
court can hardly be faulted for attempting a universal application of
vicarious liability in the small area of general aviation. Of course,
any court assuming such a crusading role must expect a most rigor-
ous inspection of its work and must adequately prepare for the logic-
al challenge it will engender.
When taken in the context of vicarious liability precedent, the
attempt of the Allegheny court to apply joint enterprise becomes
difficult to fathom. The elements of joint enterprise are clearly
enumerated by cases and authors. The only break with tradition
in the definition of joint enterprise is that reflected in the American
Law Institute's Restatement of Torts.' The action of the court in
Allegheny is quite clearly moving against the trend by broadening
the already inclusive majority definition. Particularly in its finding of
a community of interest in the purpose of the venture, the court has
accepted a number of dubious presumptions." Surely any interest
on the part of the flying school in seeing its students licensed is in-
cidental to its primary financial interest.' A community of interest
shared by Forth Corporation and Carey would be incomplete with-
out joint interest in this important feature. Finding the element of
common interest in the way accepted by the court would allow vir-
tually any relationship to be characterized as a joint enterprise solely
on the ground of some incidental area of mutual benefit. An all-en-
compassing view of a legal fiction cannot be compatible with its ini-
tial purpose. For whatever policy considerations, joint enterprise
cannot be more acceptable than the previously rejected legal fic-
tions if it is predicated upon sweeping generalizations that draw in
factual contexts without discrimination.
liability in airplane crashes. The Act met with such opposition that it was never
offered for adoption.
51 For the Restatement definition of joint enterprise, see note 28 supra. The
addition of a community of pecuniary interest to the elements of joint enterprise
would narrow the definition and restrict its application. While not accepted by
a majority of jurisdictions, some recent cases in aviation have used the Restate-
ment definition, lending support to the trend away from joint enterprise. See, e.g.,
Shoemaker v. Whistler, 513 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1974).
"See note 35 supra.
" Substantial evidence was offered at trial and reiterated in Plaintiff's appellate
brief to the effect that the financial interest of Forth Corporation was its over-
riding concern. Brief for Appellants at 93-94, Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. United
States, 504 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1974).
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The court's view of mutual control stands in a stronger position.
Right of control is a possible exception to actual presence in the
student/instructor setting. Even without the physical presence of
an instructor, the pilot is arguably within an enveloping shroud of
regulations, flight plans, instructions, and radio control which make
him susceptible to control from the school. Accepting the "right to
control" language as sufficient to meet the elemental test, physical
presence could be seen as an incidental feature useful in proof of
joint enterprise.
The court's finding of the third element of contract is premised
upon solid grounds.' Indeed, if the other elements of joint enter-
prise are present, it seems unlikely that a court will deny submission
of the issue to the jury regardless of whether an express contract
exists. In a flying school/student situation, implied contracts abound
and should more than adequately fulfill the requirement even when
no express contract for services exists.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decided Allegheny on the
grounds of joint enterprise and statutory vicarious liability. In using
a statute whose language tracks that of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958,' the court added the weight of its opinion to those who would
claim vicarious liability under one of the eighteen state statutes now
in effect." With statutory precedent for such a decision clear, 8 the
court went beyond the necessary findings and held that a prima
facie case of joint enterprise had been shown. The directive tone of
the opinion assuages any doubts that the common law decision is
mere dicta. The court was manifestly willing to proceed on the joint
enterprise theory alone. But the statutory language is not so ambigu-
ous as to require a buttress; only two of the eighteen states with
such statutes have expressly denied that they provide a civil reme-
5 See note 46 supra.
56The Indiana Code § 8-21-3-1(h) (1971) states:
Operation of aircraft or operate aircraft-the use of aircraft for
the purpose of air navigation or piloting of aircraft. Any person who
causes or authorizes the operation of aircraft, whether with or with-
out the right of legal control (in the capacity of owner, lessee,
or otherwise) of the aircraft, shall be deemed to be engaged in the
operation of aircraft within the meaning of the statutes of this state.
5 TSee note 10 supra.
8 See note 11 supra.
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dy." One must assume that the court deliberately went beyond
statutory liability in an effort to promote common law remedies. In-
stead of strengthening and encouraging further use of the legal fic-
tions, and especially joint enterprise, the lack of authority and pau-
city of expressed reasoning by this court defeated the venture before
it had a fair chance to compete. The opportunity for a persuasive
case of joint enterprise in aviation was seriously undermined.
Public policy does seem to demand a workable legal solution to
the problem faced by survivors with no viable financial expectations.
Joint enterprise, like the other legal fictions, is well adapted to re-
solving these difficulties. The whole concept of legal fictions is based
in large part on the humanistic requirements and needs of difficult
legal circumstances. The answer is not redress through bad law, but
strengthening of statutory application. The dynamism needed is best
furnished through legislative enactments that can accurately reflect
the desires of the public. The solution is not to make the common
law unrecognizable, but rather to make use of statutory potential in
effecting a sound humanitarian result. The strength of the common
law lies in its maleability, not in unrealistic distortion.
Gerald S. Reamey
TORTS-MANUFACTURER'S NEGLIGENCE-The Buyer of a Used
Airplane Can Recover in Negligence from the Airplane's Manu-
facturer for Cost of Repair, Decline in Value and Loss of Use of
the Aircraft, Absent Any Accident. Omni Flying Club, Inc. v. Cess-
na Aircraft Co., -Mass.-, 315 N.E. 2d 885 (1974).
The Omni Flying Club purchased a Cessna demonstrator aircraft
with 150 flight hours' from an independent dealer. At the time of
the sale, Omni desired the remainder of the aircraft's warranty, and
the dealer undertook to obtain that warranty for Omni.' The lan-
59Ferrari v. Byerly Aviation, Inc., 131 Ill. App. 2d 747, 268 N.E.2d 558
(1971); Guillen v. Williams, 27 Misc. 2d 575, 212 N.Y.S.2d 556 (1961).
1Omni Flying Club, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., - Mass. -, 315 N.E.2d
885 (1974).
'Id. The warranty appeared in regular print in unnumbered pages behind the
index of the aircraft owner's manual.
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guage of the warranty excluded all other warranties, express or im-
plied, including any warranty of merchantability! One year later,
the original turbocharger on the aircraft was replaced after only
580 flight hours had been registered on the plane." After another
thirty hours, the second turbocharger failed and Omni replaced the
entire engine, whose expected life was 1400 hours.' Omni sued
Cessna in a Massachusetts court on express warranty, implied war-
ranty, and negligence, but at the close of the evidence, Omni
waived the warranty counts and stood on the allegation of negli-
gence.' The jury awarded damages to Omni for the cost of repair
of the aircraft, for its decline in value, and for the loss of use of
the aircraft while it was being repaired.! Cessna appealed this ver-
dict to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, asserting that
the warranty disclaimer should bar any recovery by Omni, and that,
in any case, loss of use was not a proper element of damages." Held,
affirmed: In an action for negligent manufacture, a buyer of a
I The warranty also provided that Cessna's only obligation was to replace de-
fective parts shipped to its place of business in Kansas; that no other person
could assume any other obligation for Cessna; and that repair of the aircraft by
any unauthorized personnel would cancel the warranty. The record is unclear as
to when Omni received a copy of the manual that contained the warranty. Id.
at -, 315 N.E.2d at 886-87.
4Id.
5All parties agreed that the failure of the second turbocharger was caused
by oil starvation which was, in turn, caused by the reversal of a T-valve. The
finding of the jury was that the T-valve had been negligently reversed by Cessna
at the factory. Id.
I Omni's attorney dropped the warranty counts because, at the time of trial,
privity between the buyer and seller was a condition precedent to any warranty
action. The aircraft was not purchased from Cessna, but from an independent
dealer. This privity requirement has been abrogated by statute. See note 37 infra.
A California court has held that the implied warranty of merchantibility extends
from the manufacturer to the purchaser of a used aircraft. Lindberg v. Coutches,
167 Cal. App. 2d 828, 334 P.2d 701 (Super. Ct. 1959). See note 70 infra.
'The jury awarded damages in the amount of $19,500. This figure included
$10,000 for the decline in value of the aircraft, $8,640 for the cost of repair,
and an amount for the loss of use of the aircraft for 61 days. - Mass. at -,
315 N.E.2d at 886, 890. On Cessna's motion for new trial, the judge found that
this verdict was excessive, and ordered a new trial on the issue of damages unless
Omni agreed to a remittitur of $5,178. When the judge learned that Cessna would
appeal even this lesser amount, he let the original verdict stand. The appellate
court found that this was an abuse of discretion, violating MAss. ANN. LAWS
ch. 231, § 127 (1958).
1 Cessna also alleged that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding
of negligence and that the statute of limitations should bar Omni's action. -
Mass. at -, 315 N.E.2d at 886.
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used aircraft can recover for decline in value, cost of repair, and
loss of use of the aircraft, even when there has been no accident.!
In allowing recovery to buyers of defective products, the courts
have used three general theories: negligence, strict liability, and
warranty. The first two are a part of tort law, but the third is gov-
erned by contract law. The question which the Omni case presents
is whether tort law is suited for the area of purely economic loss"
even though recovery for pecuniary loss has traditionally been the
province of warranty. Courts have been hesitant to apply negli-
gence" or strict liability" to manufacturers for purely economic
losses; they seem reluctant to relax the privity requirement for these
losses. 3
Recovery against a manufacturer for its negligence originated in
personal injury cases,"' and recovery for property damage has been
limited to damage caused by an accident which reasonably could
have caused personal injury." The case law in Massachusetts prior
to Omni opposed recovery in negligence for pecuniary loss. In
1956, a federal court interpreting Massachusetts law held that a suit
I The term "accident" means an unintended violent physical occurrence which
either causes direct physical injury to a person or has the potential of immedi-
ately causing such an injury. The gradual deterioration of a turbocharger by oil
starvation would not be an accident.
"o The terms "purely economic loss" and "pecuniary loss" denote the monetary
damage which a buyer sustains solely from the failure of a product to fulfill his
expectations. Where there has been an accident, the loss is not purely economic.
See Comment, Purely Economic Loss in Products Liability, 4 SETON HALL L.
REV. 145 (1972).
" "[Wihere there is no accident, and no physical damage, and the only loss
is a pecuniary one, through loss of value or use of the thing sold, or the cost
of repairing it, the courts have adhered to the rule . . . that purely economic
interests are not entitled to recovery against mere negligence, and so have denied
recovery." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 665 (4th Ed. 1971).
See also Note, Manufacturer's Liability for Economic Loss, 66 COLUM. L. REV.
917, 929-31 (1966). Potential for a contrary holding can be found in a dictum
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Fisher v. Simon, 15 Wis. 2d 207, 112 N.W.2d
705 (1961).
"See text accompanying notes 24-36 infra.
3 See text accompanying notes 37-42 infra.
"
4 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944);
Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961);
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, Ill N.E. 1050 (1916).
1" International Harvester v. Sharoff, 202 F.2d 52 (10th Cir. 1953) (interpret-
ing Colorado law); Fentress v. Ven Etta Motors, 157 Cal. App. 2d 863, 323 P.2d
227 (Super. Ct. 1958); see also Comment, Purely Economic Loss in Products
Liability, 4 SETON HALL L. REV. 145 (1972).
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for purely economic losses caused by the manufacturer's negligence
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. " A
Massachusetts court in McDonough v. Whalen" recently reaffirmed
the position that any recovery in negligence for economic loss re-
quires some accident. The appellate court held in that case that
there could be no liability in tort for simple pecuniary loss caused
by defective or inferior merchandise. 8 In McDonough, sewage es-
caped across the plaintiff's land because of the defendant's negli-
gence. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachussetts
agreed with the appellate court on the issue of purely economic
losses," but held that the escape of sewage was an accident which
made the damage to the property more than just pecuniary."0
Other states have consistently followed the rule that there should
be no recovery in negligence for purely economic losses.' Historic-
18 Karl's Shoe Stores v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 145 F. Supp. 376 (D. Mass.
1956).
Even though this loss is alleged to have been ultimately due to the
negligence of defendant, the facts set forth fail to bring this case
within the limits of the decided cases extending the scope of the
liability of manufacturers to remote vendees of their products, and
hence fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Id. at 377.
11 McDonough v. Whalen, - Mass. App. -, 304 N.E.2d 199 (1973), rev'd on
other grounds, - Mass. -, 313 N.E.2d 435 (1974).
18 McDonough v. Whalen, - Mass. App. -, 304 N.E.2d 199 (1973).
12 McDonough v. Whalen, - Mass. -, 313 N.E.2d 435 (1974).
20 Id. It appears that the court is stretching the term "accident." See Note 9,
supra.
1 In Inglis v. American Motors Corp., 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583
(1965), the rule is stated that negligence must cause damage to person or other
property to be actionable. It is further stated that there is no liability for pecu-
niary loss in a negligence action against a manufacturer. 3 Ohio St. 2d at 140,
209 N.E.2d at 588.
Amodeo v. Autocraft-Hudson, 195 N.Y.S.2d 711 (Sup. Ct. 1959), aff'd, 207
N.Y.S.2d 101 (App. Div. 1960), limited the manufacturer's liability for negligence
to a consumer to personal injury and direct damage to physical property.
Wyatt v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 145 Cal. App. 2d 423, 302 P.2d 665
(1956), held that an auto manufacturer's duty was limited to the exercise of
reasonable care to insure that the car was free from defects which might reason-
ably be expected to produce bodily injury or damage to other property.
Transworld Airlines, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., I Misc. 2d 477, 148
N.Y.S.2d 284 (Sup. Ct. 1955), limited the liability in negligence of a manufac-
turer of aircraft engines which were purchased through a dealer to damages
caused by an accident attributable to latent defects in the engine.
See also Lucette Originals, Inc. v. General Cotton Converters, Inc., 8 N.Y.
App. Div. 2d 102, 185 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1959); Kalash v. Los Angeles Ladder Co.,
1 Cal. 2d 229, 34 P.2d 481 (1934); Nebelung v. Norman, 14 Cal. 2d 647, 96
P.2d 327 (1939). These cases exemplify the uniformity in the decisions.
1975]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
ally, recovery has been allowed only in cases in which the burden
of the loss on the plaintiff was judged to be too harsh. When the
courts find no onerous harshness, the loss is permitted to "lie where
it falls. '"" The consensus is that negligence is not a proper theory
for purely economic loss; the pecuniary disappointment of a pur-
chaser is not a proper occasion for recovery in negligence,' for such
an injury, by itself, is neither harsh nor onerous.
While no court has previously seemed to permit recovery under
a negligence theory, a few jurisdictions have disdained the applica-
tion of warranty law and allowed recovery in strict liability for
purely economic losses. The first case granting damage in a strict
liability action was Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc.,' in which
the New Jersey Supreme Court allowed recovery for the decline
in value of carpeting sold to the plaintiff, absent any warranty.
Several other jurisdictions have followed this quick path to award-
ing damages to a plaintiff." Using strict liability as a vehicle to re-
covery is simpler than warranty law because it permits the courts to
sidestep the warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.), " but most courts have refused to take the strict liability
path. The U.C.C. was carefully drafted to regulate the relationships
between the buyer and seller. By using strict liability to circum-
vent the U.C.C.," the courts substitute judicial legislation and avoid
this carefully drafted statute.
22 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 94 (1881). "The general principal of our
law is that loss from accident must lie where it falls .... "
23 id. at 96. "[T]he prevailing view is that [the State's] cumbrous and ex-
pensive machinery ought not to be set in motion unless some clear benefit is to
be derived from disturbing the status quo."
24 Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1964).
See Note, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1315 (1966).
1 Using a strict libaility theory is quick because it avoids the issue of liability
which pervades the remainder of tort law. It can be argued that this quickness
is the overriding factor in deciding whether to use strict liability. That strict
liability better serves one of the prime goals of tort law--compensating the vic-
tim-cannot be denied.
26 Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800
(1970); Air Prod. & Chem., Inc. v. Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206
N.W.2d 414 (1973); cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d
240 (1966).
27 See text accompanying notes 43-59 infra.
"A commentator on New Jersey law asserts that the U.C.C. provisions have
been pushed aside by the doctrine of strict liability in tort. Rapson, Products
Liability under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts between the Uniform Commercial
Code and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 692 (1964).
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Strict liability was intended to cover those areas where other
tort law is inadequate. Personal injury and serious harm to other
property caused by accident are examples of such areas. In these
cases the need to compensate the victim has been held to be super-
ior to the need to respect the contractual agreement between buyer
and seller. When physical injury occurs, it would be strange to deny
recovery because of a previous warranty agreement. A reasonable
buyer would not allow a seller to excuse himself from liability for
physical injuries caused by the fault of the seller. A seller should
not absolve himself via contract of liability for defects which are
adjudged to be physically dangerous to the user. Therefore, when
personal injury or accidental property damage are involved, the
modem trend is not to allow manufacturers to hide behind their
disclaimers of warranty.29 But when the only loss is economic and
there has been no hazardous occurrence, this same consideration is
not present. The Restatement (Second) of Torts limits the applica-
tion of strict liability to physical harm."° Strict liability should apply
to property loss only when the property has been damaged by a
dangerous defect in the product.1
The leading case expounding the non-applicability of strict lia-
bility to pecuniary losses is Seely v. White Motor Co." The Su-
" See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.2d 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960); Price v. Gatlin, 241 Or. 315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965). In Price the Oregon
Supreme Court explicitly stated that the social and economic reasons that courts
have given for extending strict liability are not persuasive in the case of the
disappointed buyer. Id. at 242, 405 P.2d at 503.
s0 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject
to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user
or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is
sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepara-
tion and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
"'Walker v. Decora, Inc., 225 Tenn. 504, 471 S.W.2d 778 (1971).
"Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17
(1965). This case is analyzed in Comment, Seely v. White Motor Co.: Retrench-
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preme Court of California, speaking through Chief Justice Traynor,
rejected the extension of strict liability to permit recovery for a
purely economic loss. The court said that strict liability is appro-
priate only when warranty rules cease to function and that war-
ranty rules function well in a commercial environment. Since war-
ranty rules have not ceased to function, holding a manufacturer
strictly liable for a plaintiff's economic losses would expose the man-
ufacturer to liability "for damages of unknown and unlimited
scope. " Traynor wrote that sellers should not be compelled by the
law to insure that each buyer is receiving exactly what he sub-
jectively thinks he is buying. A common justification for using the
doctrine of strict liability is that the plaintiff must not be forced
to internalize the great costs of the accident. In the case of a buyer
merely disappointed with the quality of his purchase, there is no
such unbearable cost to the plaintiff. As to this buyer, Traynor
stated that "he can, however, be fairly charged with the risk that the
product will not match his economic expectations unless the manu-
facturer agrees that it will."' The concurring and dissenting opinion
in Seely' argued that the warranty sections of the U.C.C. should be
applied only within the world of commerce and that small con-
sumers should be protected with strict liability.' All of the justices
seemed to agree that strict liability should not be applied to pecu-
niary losses suffered in the commercial environment of relatively
equal bargaining positions.
Warranty law provides the third theory under which a buyer may
recover in product liability. A court using this theory may adjudi-
cate the buyer's rights under the warranty, once one is proven to
exist. There are three basic requirements which a plaintiff must
ment in California on Strict Products Liability, 52 VA. L. REV. 509 (1966). The
writer states that tort law is not properly applied to economic losses.
N Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 16-17, 403 P.2d 151, 45 Cal. Rptr.
23 (1965). The Santor and Seely cases are compared in Note, 19 VAND. L. REV.
214 (1965).
'
4 Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 18, 403 P.2d 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 23
(1965).
Id. at 19, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24. This portion of the opinion
is discussed in Note, Products Liability: What Type of Loss Will the Doctrine
of Strict Liability in Tort Cover?, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 385 (1965).
36 Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 27, 403 P.2d 157, 45 Cal. Rptr. 29
(1965). It is doubtful whether a buyer such as Omni would be a small con-
sumer. See note 66 infra.
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meet to prove that a warranty exists. The first requirement is to
establish privity between the plaintiff and the manufacturer. In
Omni there is an intermediary dealer between the flying club and
Cessna, but since Massachusetts eliminated the privity require-
ment,"7 there would be no problem with privity if this case arose
today.' The second requirement is that the notice statute of the
U.C.C. must be fulfilled." If a buyer waits an unreasonable time
before pursuing his rights under the warranty, those rights are lost.
The third requirement is to prove that the statute of limitation has
not run."0 The key question in the case of defective products is
when the statute begins to run. The Omni court held that the action
arose on the date that the negligently manufactured product was
sold, not on the date it was manufactured." Once all of these re-
quirements have been satisfied, the issue of whether the warranty
has been disclaimed or waived is reached. '
U.C.C. section 2-316 applies to the limitation of warranties.' It
provides that any limitation of the warranty of merchantability
must mention merchantability and must be conspicuous if in writ-
ing. Further, any limitation of the warranty of fitness must be both
conspicuous and in writing." The purpose of these provisions is to
avoid any disclaimer that may surprise the consumer. ' The type of
damages involved in the Omni case is consequential economic
7Ssee MASS. STAT. ch. 670, § 1 (1971) which amended MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
106, § 2-318 (1974). This elimination of the privity requirement is a better course
to recovery than the stretching of negligence law. See text accompanying notes
60-76 infra.
18 See McDonough v. Whalen, - Mass. App. -, 304 N.E.2d 199, 201 (1973).
39 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-607(3)(a) (1958) states:
Where a tender has been accepted the buyer must within a reason-
able time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach
notify the seller of any breach or be barred from any remedy; ...
40 MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 260, § 2A (1974) states that a cause of action must
be brought within three years of the time when the cause of action arose. (At
the time of this case, the period was two years.)
41 Omni Flying Club, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., - Mass. -, 315 N.E.2d
885 (1974).
1 For a discussion of disclaimers under the U.C.C., see Ganz, Limitation of
Liability under the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 14 DEPAUL
L. REV. 73 (1964).
"'MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-316 (1958).
"The primary objective of S 2-316 is to avoid fine print waivers.
I See Uniform Laws Comment to MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-316 (1958).
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damages." U.C.C. section 2-719 states that consequential damages
may be excluded or limited unless such an action is unconscion-
able." While the section states that limitation of consequential dam-
ages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is
prima facie unconscionable, it concludes that limitation of damages
When the loss is commercial is not unconscionable. ' An example
of a valid limitation is restricting the buyer's remedy to repair or
replacement of non-conforming goods."9 In the Omni case, Cessna's
attempt to limit Omni's remedy to repair at Cessna's factory would
be valid under the U.C.C. if the language of the limitation were
found to be conspicuous.
The U.C.C. defines "conspicuous" in section 1-201 (10)."
Language in the body of a form must be in larger or different color
type in order to be conspicuous." Thus it would seem that the limi-
tation on warranties which appeared in the regular print of the
warranty in the unnumbered pages behind the index in the owner's
manual would not meet the test of conspicuousness. Were the dis-
claimer not conspicuous, however, the case still might not be set-
tled. In Holcomb v. Cessna Aircraft Co." the exact warranty be-
fore the court in the Omni case was considered. In this case, the
Fifth Circuit held that the disclaimer, while not conspicuous, might
not surprise a buyer who had owned four other Cessnas.' In Hol-
comb the circuit court reversed a jury verdict allowing recovery
"MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 106, §§ 714, 715(2) (1958). For purposes of § 714,
the term "consequential damages" includes
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and
needs which the seller at the time of contracting had reason to know
and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or other-
wise; and (b) injury to person or property proximately resulting
from any breach of warranty.
7 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-719(3) (1958). Unconscionability is defined
at MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-302 (1958).
48MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-719(3) (1958).
49 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-719(1)(a) (1958). See Bayne, Replacement
v. Repair: A Consumer's Brief Challenges General Motors, 24 SYRACUSE L. REV.
639 (1973).
50 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 106, § 1-201 (1958).
51 Id.
2Holcomb v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 439 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 827 (1971).
991d. at 1157-58.
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to the plaintiff for the decline in value of his negligently constructed
Cessna.'
The policy of the courts has not been favorable toward the limita-
tion of warranties." The aim is to restrict the limitation of warranties
to only those cases in which it is clearly the intent of the parties to
proceed only under express warranty.' There have been cases in
which courts have denied recovery because of the existence of an ex-
press disclaimer of which the contracting parties were aware." The
commercial forum is the proper setting for disclaimers. In Omni,
the parties had a relatively equal ability to inspect the goods and
insure against any defects. 8 The U.C.C. seeks to require full and
fair disclosure of all limitation of warranties within the context of
freedom of contract, but freedom of contract itself still remains."'
In the proper case a warranty may be limited.
In Omni v. Cessna the Massachusetts courts allowed recovery for
purely economic loss caused by negligence beyond any warranty
of merchantability. Surprisingly, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts neither presented arguments nor cited authority to
support its decision that recovery should be allowed in negligence
for economic loss, absent any accident."0 The Omni court cited
54 Id.
" See California State Bar Committee on the Commercial Code, The Uniform
Commercial Code, 37 CALIF. ST. B. J. 143-45 (1962). Many courts have limited
the effect of such clauses by:
(1) construing them strictly, Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682,
268 P.2d 1041 (1954);
(2) finding the clause inconsistent with an express warranty in the same
transaction, Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Consolidated Fisheries Co., 190 F.2d
817 (3rd Cir. 1951);
(3) finding the buyer had no notice of the clause or stating that disclaimer
clauses are against public policy and of no effect, Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors Inc., 32 N.J.2d 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); 8 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 658 (1961).
56Note, The Uniform Commercial Code and Greater Consumer Protection
under Warranty Law, 49 Ky. L. REv. 240, 254 (1960).
57 Southwest Forest Indus., Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 422 F.2d 1013
(9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 902 (1971); Cherokee Inv. v. Voiles, 433
P.2d 427 (Colo. 1968).
08 Note, Disclaimers of Warranty in Consumer Sales, 77 HARV. L. REV. 318,
325 (1963).
51 See Cudahy, Limitation o1 Warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code,
47 MARQ. L. REV. 127, 142 (1963).
60 The issues presented to the court concerning negligence treated only factual
questions. Neither side addressed the point that even if negligence were estab-
lished, settled case law would deny recovery.
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Antokol v. Barbere' to support its holding that recovery could be
allowed for loss of use, but Antokol is clearly distinguishable be-
cause it involved an auto collision, not pecuniary loss as is present
in Omni." The court cited no case in which a disappointed buyer
was permitted to recover in negligence because the product fell be-
low his expectations. The discussion in this note of prior law shows
that before the Omni case negligence had not been extended to
purely economic losses. Thus, the court's holding in Omni v. Cess-
na allowing recovery for purely economic losses caused by negli-
gence is against the authority in Massachusetts and in other states.
With negligence eliminated as an avenue of recovery, the only
other major tort area under which Omni could recover is strict
liability. Would the Massachusetts court have been more consistent
with settled law by allowing recovery under strict liability? The
holdings are not so uniform in this area. Most courts deny recovery
in strict liability for pecuniary losses, but a few permit recovery.
Two problems militate against the application of strict liability to
the situation in Omni: first, Massachusetts is not a strict liability
jurisdiction;' and secondly, the underlying philosophy of strict
liability does not justify the inclusion of purely economic losses
among the proper areas for strict tort liability." As Traynor stated,'
strict liability should be used only in cases when warranty laws
cease to function. The commercial setting of the Omni case was not
such an area. The Omni case concerned the purchase of an airplane
by a flying club from a dealer. There was no great disparity in po-
sition between the parties. The product was not an everyday ne-
cessity." The purchaser had the ability, the experience, and the time
61 Antokol v. Barber, 248 Mass. 392, 143 N.E. 350 (1924).
62 id. at 396-97, 143 N.E. at 351-52. See also Dearden v. Key, 304 Mass. 659,
24 N.E.2d 644 (1939).
63 Maloney, Current Trends in Aviation Products Liability Law, 577 INS. L. J.
53, 83 (1971).
" See the discussion in Hawkins Const. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546,
209 N.W.2d 643 (1973), in which Nebraska refused to extend strict liability to
any type of property damage. See also 7 CREIGHTON L. REV. 396 (1974).
6 See the discussion of Seely v. White Motor Co., supra notes 32-36 and ac-
companying text.
1 On January 4, 1975, a new federal warranty law became effective, the Mag-
nuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. S 2301 (1974).
The liberal provisions of this act apply to commerce in "consumer products,"
which are defined as tangible personal property, distributed in commerce and nor-
mally used for personal, family, or household purposes. This new act would not
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to compare his prospective purchase with other aircraft and other
dealers. The equities by which courts justify the extension of recov-
ery beyond warranty to strict liability were not present in Omni.
After discarding negligence and strict liability as theories for de-
ciding the case, the only remaining theory, and the proper one, is
warranty. How would Omni be handled under warranty law?" In
Omni there was a sale, an express warranty, and an attempted dis-
claimer of all warranties. If the disclaimer were successful, then
Omni could not recover. In applying the principles of warranty
law to the Omni case, the key issue would be whether the clause
limiting the warranty is conspicuous.69 The facts of the case show
that Cessna's warranty appeared on pages at the back of the owner's
manual. But the Holcomb"0 case indicates that this Cessna warranty
might not unduly surprise a person with previous experience in buy-
ing airplanes. Presumably, the Omni Flying Club was an experi-
enced aircraft purchaser.
No matter which result is reached on the issue of the validity of
the disclaimer, the case is best decided under contract law.' War-
ranty law was developed to handle just such cases as Omni."' To
bring in tort law both confuses the issue and short-circuits a care-
fully constructed body of law.' Tort law should be confined to the
change the law concerning sales of aircraft. Since this consumer protection legis-
lation was not extended to cover the buyers of airplanes, it may be inferred that
Congress assumed that a fairly equal bargaining position exists between the buyers
and sellers of aircraft.
67 In the actual trial, Omni waived all of its counts save the negligence count.
This would not preclude the court from basing its decision in warranty, however.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 54(c).
68 See the discussion of applicable U.C.C. provisions, supra notes 39, 43-51
and accompanying text.
69 An implied warranty of fitness does extend through the sale of a used air-
plane. Such a warranty could be avoided only by an express disclaimer. Lindberg
v. Coutches, 167 Cal. App. 2d 828, 334 P.2d 701 (Super. Ct. 1959).
70 See the discussion of Holcomb v. Cessna Aircraft Co., supra notes 52-54
and accompanying text.
" MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 106, 5 1-201(10) (1958) states that the issue of con-
spicuousness is to be decided by the court.
72 Just as tort law should not encroach upon purely economic losses, warranty
law is ill-suited for personal injury cases. For a discussion of the tension between
warranty and tort, see Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and
Disclaimers in Defective Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974 (1966).
" Inglis v. American Motors, 3 Ohio St. 2d 132, 209 N.E.2d 583 (1965),
quoting Prosser to the effect that in an action involving product liability based
on negligence:
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area of accidents and personal injuries;' the best arena for handling
purely economic losses is warranty law.
The best view is that an action for recovery of economic loss is
contractual in nature."5 The law of sales was formulated to cover
such a loss. A seller should be allowed to contract certain risks
with the buyer. To allow tort law to enter into this area would hin-
der the seller's flexibility and would harm the entire commercial
context. A prudent seller would have to increase the cost of his
product to provide funds to satisfy the claims of disappointed buyers
such as Omni. The opportunity for the seller to be flexible is an im-
portant one in transactions that do not involve protection from
dangerous defects. The unpredictable impact of tort law would hin-
der the ability of manufacturers and retailers to arrive at a price for
their goods that would be fair for all concrened." The U.C.C. has
been drafted to resolve commercial loss claims. It should be used
except when overriding considerations, such as personal physical
injury or accident, justify the introduction of tort law. Extending
the doctrines of negligence and strict liability to purely economic
losses is a mistake.
Bruce Keplinger
The only kind of damage not included is pecuniary loss. In other
words, loss of the benefit of the bargain .... that kind of pecuniary
loss is still, so far as I can see, limited to contracts between the
parties, and the usual rule that for negligence there is no liability
for mere pecuniary loss of a bargain [still prevails].
Prosser, CLEVELAND B. Ass'N J. (May, 1965) 174-75.
" For discussion of the logical superiority of warranty law over tort law in
the area of economic loss, see Note, Manufacturer's Liability to Remote Pur-
chasers for 'Economic Loss' Damages-Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REV.
539 (1966); Note, Economic Loss from Defective Products, 4 WILLIAMErTE L.
REV. 402 (1967).
" See Sales, An Overview of Strict Tort Liability in Texas, 11 HoUSTON L.
REV. 1043, 1061-62 (1974).
"
6See Speidel, Products Liability, Economic Loss and the U.C.C., 40 TENN.
L. REV. 309, 327 (1973).
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TORTS--ATC LIABILITY-Aircraft Clearance Given Was One
Not Reasonably Designed to Insure the Aircraft's Safety and There-
fore Constituted Negligence. Todd v. United States, 384 F. Supp.
1284 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
On the morning of November 21, 1967, George Todd took off
alone from Jacksonville, Florida under Visual Flight Rule (VFR)
conditions.1 After takeoff he was issued an Instrument Flight Rule2
(IFR) clearance to the Ashland, Alabama Airport. Birmingham,
Alabama Approach Control,3 the control tower for Ashland, cleared
Todd for an approach to the Ashland airport but after circling the
field Todd decided he would not land, apparently because of a lack
of visibility.' After reporting that he was unable to land, Todd re-
quested a clearance approach to Anniston, Alabama. At the time
of that request Todd was experiencing limited visibility and was
flying directly over terrain designated as mountainous.' Neverthe-
less, Birmingham issued him a cruise clearance6 approach to Anni-
ston at 4,000 feet without first determining the position of the air-
craft.7 This clearance gave Todd the authority to descend from his
current altitude of 4,000 feet anytime during the remainder of the
flight. Todd then requested a change in destination from Anniston
to Talladega, Alabama, and again without first determining the po-
I VFR conditions are best thought of as those involving "good" weather.
14 C.F.R. § 91.105 (1975). Regulations (c) and (d) (1) state that for aircraft
operations within a control zone a ceiling of at least 1,000 feet is required and
take-offs or landings are prohibited whenever ground visibility is less than three
statute miles. For a more detailed explanation of IFR and VFR, see generally
Note, Government Liability for Negligence of Air Traffic Controllers, 13 S. TEX.
L.J. 41 (1972).
2Under IFR, the Air Traffic Controller (ATC) directs virtually every move-
ment (e.g., altitude, speed, rate of descent, and glide slope) of the aircraft by
radio commands to the pilot. This system is necessary when the pilot's visibility
is impaired by clouds, fog, rain, or other adverse weather and for commercial
aviation. 14 C.F.R. § 91.115-91.129 (1975).
3 Birmingham Approach Control controlled the Ashland, Anniston and Tal-
ladega area at lower levels. 384 F. Supp. at 1287.
'Visibility was approximately one mile in light rain. 384 F. Supp. at 1287.
'Part 95 of the Federal Aviation Regulations, 14 C.F.R. S 95.13 (1975)
designates the Ashland, Anniston, Talladega area as the Eastern United States
Mountainous area.
" The word cruise in a clearance indicates to the pilot that a climb to or a
descent from the indicated altitude may be made at the pilot's discretion. 384 F.
Supp. at 1288.
' 384 F. Supp. at 1287.
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sition of the aircraft, Birmingham control issued Todd another
cruise clearance at 4,000 feet Todd then reported leaving the
4,000 foot level and approximately seven minutes later9 collided
with the Cheaha Mountains on a heading which was carrying him
directly toward the Talladega Airport. The collision, which occur-
red at 2,100 feet, instantly killed Todd and completely destroyed
the plane. Todd's survivors brought this survival and wrongful
death action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)"0 against
the United States. They claimed that the Air Traffic Controller's
(ATC's) clearance, which enabled Todd to descend from his alti-
tude at anytime and was issued without a concurrent warning of the
weather obscured mountains, constituted negligence and was the
proximate cause of Todd's death. The Government claimed that
Todd, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have been aware
of the mountains and that the cruise clearance, without a concur-
rent warning, did not constitute negligence. Held: The clearance
given was one not reasonably designed to insure the aircraft's safe-
ty and therefore constituted negligence,11 although Todd's failure
to be aware of the mountains constituted contributory negligence
and thus precluded recovery.' Todd v. United States 384 F.Supp.
1284 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
In reaching the decision that giving the clearance and failing to
warn of the weather'3 obscured mountains constituted negligence on
8 Id. at 1288.
9At 10:53 a.m. Todd reported leaving 4,000 feet. At 11:00 a.m. Todd in-
quired about the weather and then gave no reply to the Talladega's fixed based
operator's response. 384 F. Supp. at 1288.
1028 U.S.C. 1346(b) (1970) reads as follows:
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district
courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims
against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after
January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury
or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment, under circumstances where the United States,
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
384 F. Supp. at 1292.
"The accident occurred in Alabama, which follows the common law rule
that contributory negligence operates as a complete bar to recovery. 384 F. Supp.
at 1294.
"The court viewed the clearance given and failure to warn as interdependent
issues which must be viewed together. The strong implication was that had the
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the part of the United States, the court continued the widespread
trend toward expanding the liability of the ATC!" and the United
States for air catastrophies.5 Liability was first established, for all
practical purposes8 in the landmark case of Eastern Air Lines v.
Union Trust Co." in which it was held that as a result of the FT-
CA" individuals may recover from the federal government for neg-
ligent acts of the ATC. In that case, two planes collided after being
cleared by the ATC to land on the same runway at approximately
the same time. The government claimed that it could not be held
liable because it had not consented to be sued for negligent acts of
the ATC. The government based its claim on the theory that the
ATC performed discretionary acts which are expressly excluded
from potential liability under section 1346(b) of the FTCA." In
holding that the discretionary function exception of the FTCA was
not applicable, the court declared that ATC actions are operational?
ATC issued a warning of the mountain with the cruise clearance then the clear-
ance given would not have been negligent. 384 F. Supp. 1292.
14 The ATC is the function within the Federal Aviation Administration charged
with the safe conduct of aircraft flight. ATC activities have been defined to in-
clude: 1) taking appropriate action to prevent air collisions, 2) maintaining an
orderly flow of air traffic, and 3) furnishing the necessary information and ad-
vice the pilot needs to safely operate his aircraft. Smerdon v. United States, 135
F. Supp. 929, 931 (D. Mass. 1955). For the statutory basis of the ATC's respons-
ibility see 49 U.S.C. § 1348 (1970).
"See generally Levy, The Expanding Responsibility of the Government Air
Traffic Controller, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 40 (1968) and Note, The Expanding
Liability of the Air Traffic Controller, 39 J. AIR L. & COM. 599 (1973).
18 An interesting question is whether an air traffic controller could have been
sued as an individual prior to this time. Curiously, none of the notes or comments
dealing exclusively with ATC liability contain any discussion of that liability prior
to Eastern Airlines.
17221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
1828 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
'
8 The pertinent portion of 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1970) which disallows suits
against the Government when its employees are performing discretionary func-
tions, is as follows:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title
shall not apply to:
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission or an employee of
the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute
or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise
or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the dis-
cretion involved be abused.
10See 221 F.2d at 75. The distinction the court makes between discretionary
and operational is as follows:
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and that the FTCA permits suit against the Government for negli-
gent operational actions.
As could be expected, Eastern Air Lines" opened the floodgates
for a multitude of suits against the government to recover for the
negligent actions of the ATC. The basic history of these actions, as
well as the standard of duties '2 which evolved from them, were set
forth in American Airlines v. United States.' The court in Ameri-
can Airlines" began its historical analysis by looking at a mid-air
collision case, United States v. Schultetus." In that case the court
failed to find negligence on the part of the United States despite the
fact that the ATC had issued a landing clearance that resulted in a
mid-air collision." The decision was based on the proposition that
the pilot and not the ATC was directly responsible for the operation
of the aircraft." The court in Schultetus explained that by main-
taining a proper watch, the pilots could have avoided the collision;
therefore the actions of the ATC could not have proximately caused
the crash. The court also emphasized that the primary responsibility
for the operation of the aircraft did not terminate after the receipt
of a clearance from the ATC, " since the clearance issued was per-
missive in nature and did not relieve the pilot from exercising rea-
sonable care in executing the provisions of the clearance. Therefore,
when the pilot had the direct responsibility to avoid a collision, as
was the case under VFR conditions," that responsibility did not ter-
minate merely because a clearance had been issued from the tower."
The court in American Airlines then continued its historical
It was discretionary to decide to operate the control tower, but
once that decision was made the day to day acts necessary to carry
out that decision by the Air Traffic Controllers are operational and
thus not exempt from liability under the discretionary examination
of the F.T.C.A. 221 F.2d at 77.
21221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
22 For both the pilot and the A.T.C.
23418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969). The Todd case quoted extensively from sev-
eral sections of the American Airlines opinion.
24 Id.
2277 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1960).
1 The descending pilot was flying under VFR conditions and was warned by
the ATC of another aircraft in the vicinity. 277 F.2d at 322.
2 277 F.2d at 326.
2 81 d. at 327.
29 For a list of cases supporting this proposition see note 56 infra.
30 See generally S. Speizer, Preparation for Aviation Negligence Cases at 397.
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analysis by noting that there is one situation in which the pilot is
not held directly responsible for the operation of the aircraft. This
situation, which occurs when the pilot is unaware of the facts he
needs in order to operate the aircraft safely, was illustrated in
Hartz v. United States." In that case, the failure of the ATC to
warn properly a small private plane preparing to take off behind
a DC7 of wake turbulance, resulted in the take-off crash of the
small plane. In clearifying the Schultetus holding that a pilot is le-
gally responsible for the operation of his aircraft, the American
Airlines court emphasized that before a pilot can be held legally
responsible for his aircraft he must know, or in the exercise of rea-
sonable care be held to have known, those facts that were material
to the safe operation of the aircraft." The fifth circuit in American
Airlines reaffirmed this position by expressly approving the language
used in Ingham v. Eastern Airlines.' In Ingham, the court found
ATC liability when the ATC failed to report to the pilot a drop in
visibility. This drop brought the existing weather conditions dan-
gerously close to minimum visibility required for landing, and was
considered by the Ingham court to be a critical change, which, in
the interest of safety, should have been reported to the crew. The
court declared that had the pilot known of this change he might
have decided to direct the aircraft to another city rather than at-
tempt the landing that resulted in disaster." Furthermore, the court
in Ingham emphasized that the final decision to land is left to the
discretion of the pilot and the failure of the ATC to provide him
the pertinent information needed to make that decision proximately
caused the accident.
Clearly, the distinguishing feature in finding liability in Hartz'
and Ingham" and not finding liability in Schultetus was that in
Schultetus the pilot was (or in the exercise of reasonable care
31 387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968).
31 Id. at 873.
- 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1967).
Id. at 236.
'5387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968).
- 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1967).
7277 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1960).
38 Id.
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should have been) aware of the danger and in Hartz" and Ingham'
he was not. This distinction provided the framework from which
the American Airlines court set forth the four standards of duty for
pilots and the ATC. They were reiterated by the court in Todd:1
1. The pilot is in command of the aircraft, is directly responsible
for its operation, and has final authority as to its operation.
2. Before a pilot can be held legally responsible for the movement
of his aircraft he must know, or be held to have known, these
facts which were then material to its safe operation. Certainly,
the pilot is charged with that knowledge which in the exercise
of the highest degree of care he should have known.
3. The air traffic controller must give the warnings specified in the
manuals.
4. The A.T.C., whether required by the manuals or not, must warn
of dangers reasonable apparent to him but not apparent in the
exercise of due care to the pilot."2
The Todd court, while acknowledging that the clearance given and
the duty of the ATC to warn of the possible obstruction of the
mountains were interdependent issues which must be viewed to-
gether, held that there was a duty to warn even though the obstruc-
tion of the mountains should have been equally obvious to Todd in
the exercise of due care.' The court implied that this duty to warn
arose under the fourth standard of duty set forth in American Air-
lines." This is a misinterpretation, however, of both that standard
and the implications of the American Airlines' case itself.
In American Airlines" a plane crashed when it failed to maintain
-"1387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1960).
40373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1967).
"1 384 F. Supp. 1284 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
42418 F.2d at 193. In addition to these four standards, American Airlines
sets forth a fifth standard that was not included in the Todd opinion.
Determined by the facts of the particular case, due care may require
an air traffic controller, over and beyond the requirements of the
manuals, to delay clearance for a take-off or landing. If, however,
a clearance is duly granted the operation of the aircraft is the sole
responsibility of the pilot, with which the air traffic controller is not
to interfere except as specifically required by the FAA Air Traffic
Manuals.
Id. at 193.
"' 384 F. Supp. at 1292.




a sufficient altitude as it completed its landing approach during a
thunderstorm. American Airlines claimed that the ATC allowed
it to descend 255 feet below the elevation of the runway and that
a downdraft from the thunderstorm made it impossible to regain
the proper altitude needed for landing. Although the court did not
find the presence of a downdraft, the case implied that even if there
was a downdraft, the crew was in the same position as the ATC
to know of a possible downdraft in a thunderstorm and consequent-
ly there could be no liability."7 As pointed out by the court, the key
question was whether any actions or omissions by the ATC mis-
led the pilots and adversely affected their ability in the exercise
of the highest degree of care to have foreseen the possibility of
such a force."" In finding no such actions or omissions, the court
emphasized that nothing transmitted or omitted by the ATC caused
the aircraft to descend to such a low altitude that the crash became
inevitable." Consequently, the key consideration in American Air-
lines' was that even had there been a downdraft which had pre-
vented the plane from acquiring the necessary altitude needed for
a safe landing, the pilot, in the exercise of due care, should have been
aware of such a possibility; hence, any failure of ATC to warn of
the possibility could not have been a proximate cause of this crash.
The concept that the ATC's duty to warn turns on whether the
danger is apparent to the pilot (or would have been apparent in the
exercise of due care) is illustrated in many cases of ATC liability.
For example, in Coatney v. Berkshire," two planes collided under
VFR conditions after the ATC failed to warn the pilot of the con-
verging courses of the two aircraft. The court found the ATC to
be free of liability and held that both pilots should have monitored
the control tower and become familiar with the other's position. The
court also pointed out that with visibility of 15 miles both pilots
should have maintained an adequate lookout, which would have
prevented the collision. The decision in Coatney v. Berkshire' was
typical of a multitude of cases involving air catastrophies under
47 Id. at 194, 195.
" Id. at 193.
4Id. at 195.
50Id. at 180.
1 500 F.2d 290 (8th Cir. 1974).
52 Id.
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VFR conditions. As the court explained in Coatney,"3 the law is well
settled that under VFR conditions the primary responsibility for
the operation of the aircraft rests with the pilot, regardless of the
traffic clearance." Other courts have reached the same decisions
(no liability for the ATC under VFR conditions) because the pilot
has the same ability to view the approaching aircraft as does the
ATC. These cases all indicate that under VFR conditions the pilot
and not the ATC must be held responsible for any collisions be-
tween aircraft."
In addition to the collision cases under clear weather conditions,
two of the cases that best illustrate the concept that the ATC's duty
to warn turns on whether the danger is apparent to the pilot are the
landing accident cases of Blount Brothers Corp. v. Louisian5 and
Harris v. United States." In Blount," the failure of the ATC to
warn the pilot of a displaced runway and a seven foot mound of
construction sand did not constitute negligence because the condi-
tions were published in the Notice to Airmen" and the pilot, in the
exercise of reasonable care, should have been aware of the condition.
In Harris,"' the failure of the ATC to warn the pilot of a power line
obstruction on the runway approach was negligent, because the
ATC knew that the pilot was unfamiliar with the area and did not
know of the obstructions (nor could have known of them in the
exercise of reasonable care).
Therefore, the Todd'2 conclusion that failure to warn of the moun-
53 Id.
54 ld. at 292.
11 In Hamilton v. United States, 497 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1974) the court point-
ed out that in VFR cases the pilot is in much better position to view other air-
craft than the ATC.
56 Tilley v. United States, 375 F.2d 678, 682 (4th Cir. 1967). See also United
States v. Miller, 303 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,371 United States
955 (1963); Hamilton v. United States, 497 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964); United States v. Schulteus, 277
F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1960).
57333 F. Supp. 327 (E.D. La. 1971).
58333 F. Supp. 870 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
59333 F. Supp. 327 (E.D. La. 1971).
*°Notice to Airmen was publicized to the aviation public when the FAA
published the notice in the Airmen Aviation Manual. Blount Brothers subscribed
to manual but neither the pilot nor co-pilot consulted the notices in the manual
before take-off.
81333 F. Supp. 870 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
62384 F. Supp. 1284 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
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tainous area and that descent might prove dangerous, when Todd,
under the exercise of reasonable care, should have been aware of
the situation himself was a clear departure from both the fourth
standard of American Airlines" and applicable case law.' It was a
result that could only be explained by adding a fifth standard of
duty (to the four delineated in American Airlines)," and that was
precisely what the Todd court did. The court noted:
Determined by the facts of the case, due care requires an ATC
to issue clearances in accordance with FAA manuals and over and
beyond the requirements of the manual the clearances issued must
be reasonably designed to insure the safety of the aircraft flight."
"3418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969).
"See also Dickens v. United States, 378 F. Supp. 845 (S.D. Tex. 1974)
where failure to warn of wake turbulence was a proximate cause of crash because
the pilot could not have foreseen that a larger plane had landed just before him;
Black v. United States, 441 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1971) where the failure of the
operator to warn the pilot of the presence of the storm could not be regarded as
a proximate cause of the crash because the pilot discovered the storm himself;
Neff v. United States, 420 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1969) where the control tower's
failure to warn of an approaching storm was not negligence because the crew
should have been aware of the weather conditions and anticipated the storm. But
see Stork v. United States, 430 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1970) where ATC granted a
take-off clearance in zero visibility and failed to warn pilot of the extreme danger
involved in such a flight. The court held that the pilot's apparent knowledge of
the dangerous conditions does not obviate the need for a warning from the ATC.
However, in Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1972) the
Ninth Circuit reached the opposite result (no duty) in a similar factual situation
and limited Stork by stating that the clearance given in Stork was a violation
of the Federal Regulation which forbids a chartered airplane from taking off in
zero visibility. (14 C.F.R. § 42.55); see also United States v. Furumizo, 381 F.2d
965 (9th Cir. 1967) where the court held that the ATC had a duty to repeat a
warning regarding wake turbulence when the pilot was proceeding to take-off
before the time required for turbulence to dissipate in full view of the ATC.
6418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969).
11384 F. Supp. at 1291. It should be noted that this is clearly a different
standard than the fifth standard set forth in American Airlines (see note 42 supra).
The fifth standard in American states that there are some situations in which the
ATC should delay clearance for a take-off or landing. That standard says nothing
to the effect that the clearance, once given, should be reasonably designed to
insure the safety of the aircraft. The point of American Airlines was that even
if the ATC had permitted the plane to descend to a level where the downdraft
effects of a thunderstorm made it impossible to regain the proper altitude needed
for a safe landing, there would be no liability because the pilot was in the same
position to know of the possible downdraft effects as the ATC. Thus, despite
the fact that a clearance, which allows a plane to descend some 255 feet below
the runway during a thunderstorm, would have to be considered "one not reason-
ably designed to insure the safety of the aircraft" the court in American Airlines
determined that there would be no liability in this situation. Therefore, it must be
concluded that the new Todd standard does extend the ATC's potential liability
beyond the five standards set forth in American Airlines.
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This fifth standard, which finds liability without regard to whether
the pilot knew or in the exercise of due care should have known of
the danger that caused the plane to crash, appears to eliminate the
requirement of determining whether the failure to warn was a proxi-
mate cause of the crash. In eliminating this question of proximate
cause, the Todd court has greatly expanded the potential liability
of the ATC.
The reason that the courts have failed to find liability for failure
to warn in the VFR cases"7 is because the pilot is able to view the
entire situation himself so that the failure to warn by another party
cannot be regarded as the proximate cause of the crash." Similarly,
when a pilot who is flying under poor weather conditions actually
discovers the danger, the failure to warn cannot be regarded as the
proximate cause of the crash. As the court noted in Black v. United
States,"' the failure of the ATC to warn the pilot of the presence of
a storm when the pilot himself had discovered it, could not be re-
garded as the proximate cause of the crash."0 Only when the danger
07 Some commentators contend (See note, The Expanding Liability of the Air
Traffic Controller, 39 J. AIR L. & COM. 599, 604-08 1973) that the reason the
courts are more likely to find liability in the IFR case (as opposed to the VFR
case) is one of control. Under IFR the ATC controls the activity of the aircraft at
all times and under VFR the ATC only controls the aircraft while it is in a
designated control zone. Control zone is defined as a circular area with a radius
of five miles and any extension necessary to include instrument approach and
departure paths, 14 C.F.R. S 71.11 (1973). Therefore, because the pilot has more
control in the VFR situation, he has a greater responsibility in preventing air
collisions than in the case (IFR) where the pilot has relinquished much of the
control of his aircraft to the ATC. This analysis breaks down, however, when
one considers that even in IFR cases the courts maintain that the pilot is still
the person directly responsible for the operation of the aircraft. Both Todd and
American Airlines were IFR cases and yet both contend that the pilot is directly
responsible for the operation of the aircraft. When it comes to pilot responsibility
these two cases make no distinction between the IFR and VFR situations. Fur-
thermore, the control argument is also lacking because many of the VFR colli-
sions occur within the control zone where the ATC does have control of the
aircraft. See Coatney v. Berkshire, 500 F.2d 290 (8th Cir. 1974) where the
collision occurred while the planes were within the control zone and yet the pilots
were still held directly responsible for the operation of the aircraft. Therefore,
since courts hold that pilots in all situations are directly responsible for the opera-
tion of the aircraft, and many of the VFR cases deal with collisions within the
control zone, the argument that the difference in liability is explained by a differ-
ence of control is not very persuasive.
8 See Hamilton v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 426 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
69441 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1971).
7 d. at 745.
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is unknown to the pilot can one be sure that a causal connection
exists between the lack of a warning and the collision."
In finding negligence on the part of the ATC in Todd,' however,
the court never discussed how the clearance given could have had a
causal connection to the crash when the pilot in the exercise of due
care should have been aware of weather obscured mountains. It is a
question which the court should have discussed, and its failure to
discuss it leaves only one conclusion. The court has established a
standard that finds a causal connection between the ATC's action
and the subsequent collision whenever the actions of the ATC are
not reasonably designed to isure the safety of the aircraft. It has es-
tablished a standard which fails to consider whether the pilot in the
exercise of due care should have been equally aware of the danger.
And most important of all, it has established a standard that defi-
nitely takes the primary responsibility for the operation of the air-
craft away from the pilot and places it on the ATC and the United
States.
Therefore, the actions of the ATC in giving a cruise clearance,
without a concurrent warning of the weather obscured mountains,
constituted negligence on the part of the United States, despite the
fact that the pilot himself in the exercise of due care should have
been aware of the mountains. These actions were negligent be-
cause they were "not reasonably designed to insure the safety of the
aircraft."'"
The far reaching implications of this reasoning"4 can be best illus-
trated by applying the Todd standard to any of the VFR cases"
previously discussed. ' For example, in Coatney v. Berkshire" the
71 See United States v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964).
12 384 F. Supp. 1284 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
r3Id. at 1291.
4 Id.
I See note 56 supra.
70 It is possible to extend the Todd court's reasoning in the IFR situation to
the VFR situation for the following reasons: 1) Both American Airlines and
Todd when setting forth the four standards of duties made no distinction between
the duties of the ATC and the pilot in VFR and IFR situations. 2) The Todd
court in discussing the contributory negligence question relied primarily on VFR
case law to emphasize that Todd had the primary responsibility for operating the
aircraft and that responsibility did not diminish because of a clearance from the
tower (384 F. Supp. at 1284). 3) Thus based on the Todd court's language
and the prior cases cited to support it, it is clear that the new standard set
forth in Todd applies to both VFR and IFR situations.
77 500 F.2d 290 (8th Cir. 1974).
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court held that although the ATC had issued a clearance that re-
sulted in the mid-air collision, there was no liability because the pri-
mary responsibility for the operation of the aircraft rested with the
pilot and both pilots could have avoided the accident by maintain-
ing a proper lookout. Therefore, the clearnce issued by the ATC
could not have been the proximate cause of the crash. Thus, Coat-
ney reaffirmed the principle that when the pilot possesses (or in the
exercise of reasonable care should have possessed) the same amount
of information as the ATC in a particular situation, the primary
responsibility for the operation of the aircraft rests with the pilot.
Furthermore, this responsibility does not terminate merely because
the ATC has issued a clearance."'
If one were to apply the reasoning of Todd" to the Coatney case
a different result would be reached because the clearance given in
Coatney was not reasonably designed to insure the safety of the
aircraft, despite the fact that both pilots in the exercise of reason-
able care could have avoided the collision. Thus, the effect of the
Todd standard is to shift the primary responsibility for operating
the aircraft from the pilot to the ATC, even in those cases in which
the pilot possesses adequate means to avoid the collision, notwith-
standing the clearance issued by the ATC. This shift evokes a con-
siderable question of fairness when one considers the relative posi-
tion of the parties during many air disasters. On many occasions
the pilot and not the ATC is in a better position to insure the air-
craft's safety. For example, in Hamilton v. United States," the court
emphasized that the pilot flying under VFR conditions is often in a
better position than the controller in the tower to view approaching
aircraft and other types of danger. Furthermore, the pilot need only
be concerned with one aircraft's safety while the ATC must be con-
cerned with the safety of every aircraft in the control zone." Clear-
ly, in those situations it is hard to justify passing the primary re-
sponsibility for disaster from the pilot to the ATC. Or, in more pre-
cise terms, why should the responsibility pass from the pilot to the
United States taxpayer?
" See note 30 supra.
"384 F. Supp. 1284 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
10343 F. Supp. 426 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
81 Id. at 432.
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Prior to Todd82 it had been almost universally held that the ATC's
duty to warn existed only when the danger was not apparent to the
pilot in the exercise of reasonable care.8" In holding that this duty
exists even in those cases when the danger is apparent, the court has
greatly expanded the ATC's potential liability. It has created a duty
to warn in every case in which failure to warn would reasonably
impair the safe operation of the aircraft. This is not to say, however,
that a determination of the pilot's knowledge is no longer important.
This determination is critical for the purposes of determining con-
tributory negligence. For example, in Todd," the pilot was unable
to recover despite the ATC's negligence because under the exercise
of reasonable care he should have been aware of the presence of the
mountains into which he eventually collided. His failure to be aware
of the mountains constituted contributory negligence,' and under
Alabama law" contributory negligence operated as a complete bar
to recovery. Therefore, the ATC's potential liability increased be-
cause of the holding that the failure to warn constituted negligence,
although its actual liability remained unchanged because of the doc-
trine of contributory negligence.
This result, however, does not indicate that the Todd" holding
has little significance in determining the actual lilability in failure to
warn cases. It has great significance in the many states that apply
comparative negligence doctrines." In those states, contributory neg-
ligence does not operate as a complete defense to any negligence
action. Therefore, if this action had been brought in a comparative
negligence state, plaintiff would have been able to recover at least
82384 F. Supp. 1284 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
80United States v. American Airlines, 418 F.2d 180, 193 (5th Cir. 1969).
384 F. Supp. 1284 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
MId. 384 F. Supp. at 1294.
", Where the Todd case took place.
87 384 F. Supp. 1284 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
88 The doctrine of comparative negligence allows the plaintiff to recover a
proportion of his injuries despite the fact he was contributorily negligent, see
generally GREGORY AND KALVEN, LAWS AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, pp. 248-60. A
substantial number of states have adopted comparative negligence statutes which
are applicable to all negligent actions. These states include: Arkansas, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Nebraska, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Nevada, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Washington and Wis-
consin. For a general discussion of the extent of comparative negligence doctrine
in the United States, see 57 AM. JUR. 2d 431 (1971).
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a portion of his loss from the Government. Thus, the Todd hold-
ing does have an actual effect on ATC liability; it enables the pilot
in a comparative negligence state to recover a portion of his loss
from the government in a situation in which he previously would
have recovered nothing."'
Michael A. Grossman
FEDERALISM-AIRPORT EXPANSION-The Airport and Air-
way Development Act of 1970 Does Not Preempt the Field of Air-
port Expansion and Development Nor Does the Award of a Plan-
ning Grant Under the Act Constitute Federal Action So Significant
As To Require an Environmental Impact Statement Under the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Town of New Windsor v.
Ronan, 13 Av. L. Rep. 17,365 - F. Supp. - (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
In 1971, the New York Legislature passed an act' authorizing
the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) to establish an
airport for domestic and international air travel and freight trans-
port to be located at Stewart Airport. Pursuant to this authority,
the MTA sought to take, by eminent domain proceedings, some
9,000 acres adjacent to the airport. Various landowners and mu-
nicipal organizations brought action in federal district court to block
the MTA's taking of the lands. Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia,' that the
891 In reality the Todd holding will also affect those people in non-comparative
negligence states. Many tort scholars are convinced that juries regard the con-
tributory negligence rule (complete bar to recovery) as too harsh and the juries
have in fact been applying the doctrine of comparative negligence in their verdict.
See generally Negligence-A Judge Expresses His Views, 12 NACCA L.J. 211
(1955).
1Act of April 26, 1971, New York State Laws, Chapter 472, as amended,
May 27, 1971, New York State Laws, Chapter 473.
'Plaintiffs also claimed that the taking of the lands was in violation of Four-
teenth Amendment guarantees of due process and that the MTA acted ultra vires
under state law in taking the lands. With respect to the first claim, the court fol-
lowed the reasoning of the state court in County of Orange v. Metropolitan Trans-
portation Authority, 71 Misc.2d 691, 337 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct. Orange County
1971), afJ'd mem., 39 A.D.2d 839, 332 N.Y.S.2d 420 (2d Dep't 1972), and agreed
that there could be no genuine doubt that the creation or expansion of an airport
is a public purpose for which the power of eminent domain could be validly
exercised. With respect to the second claim, the court, while recognizing that,
pursuant to the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, it had the Constitutional power
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taking was contrary to the provisions of the Airport and Airway
Development Act of 1970 (AADA)' since the contemplated air-
port expansion was or would necessarily be within a National Air-
port System Plan; and therefore the approval of the Secretary of
Transportation was required.' Plaintiffs further alleged that the con-
templated development involved "major federal action significantly
affecting the quality of the human enrivonment"' and, therefore, a
detailed environmental impact statement was required under the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). In particu-
lar, plaintiffs alleged that receipt by the state of a planning grant
under the AADA so federalized the airport expansion as to make an
environmental impact statement mandatory. Held, dismissed: The
AADA does not preempt the field of airport expansion and develop-
ment nor does the award of a planning grant under the AADA
constitute federal action so significant as to require an environmen-
tal impact statement under NEPA.
Choosing a location for a major airport is perhaps the most vex-
ing problem associated with new airport construction." There are
serious concerns over aircraft noise, air pollution, the effect on wild-
life, water tables, open land, and the economic impact on surround-
ing communities.! In some instances, these concerns appear to have
been of only limited importance in airport planning."0 These inci-
dents raise the fear that future airport planning may lead to similar
results. Furthermore, methods for dealing with environmental
problems after construction or expansion has been completed
have been less than successful. Municipalities cannot prohibit
to hear the matter, exercised its discretion and refrained from deciding the issue,
holding that it was best left to decision in state court. The action in state court
has not been pursued
8 Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.
(1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973).
449 U.S.C. § 1712 (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973).
549 U.S.C. S 1716(c)(1) (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973).
6 3 Av. L. REP. at 17,367.
7 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)
(1970).
' Harper, The Airport Location Problem: The Case of Minneapolis-St. Paul,
38 ICC PRAc. J. 550, 552 (1971).
'Id. at 552-53.
"
0See Berger, You Know I Can't Hear You When the Planes Are Flying, 4
URBAN LAWYER 1 (1972); Comment, Jetport: Planning and Politics in the Big
Cypress Swamp, 25 U. MIAMI L. REV. 713 (1971).
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scheduled airline activities by setting noise limits" or minimum ele-
vation limits. 2 Zoning restrictions may not impose more than minor
burdens on land use nor bar activities already in existence.' Tres-
pass actions have been largely unsuccessful and recovery in nui-
sance is rare. " Actions in inverse condemnation have been more
successful but, at least in federal courts, there is often a requirement
of showing that damage resulted from direct overflight."5 Even if
a damage action is successful, the prevailing plaintiff must often
continue to live with the problem. Because of environmental con-
cern, the inability or unwillingness of state agencies to properly
account for such concern in airport planning, and the inappro-
priateness of other remedies, there has been an increasing trend to
stop airport problems at their inception-that is, by preventing
airport construction or expansion from occurring.
The search for a fourth major airport to serve the New York met-
ropolitan area is an example of this trend. The search began in 1959
when the Port of New York Authority published a report indicat-
ing that the demand for air transportation by the end of the follow-
ing decade would exceed the capabilities of the area's three major
airports, Newark, Kennedy, and LaGuardia.' Although various
plans were suggested over the years and numerous studies were
made," by 1970 no acceptable site had yet been located. In that
year a task force of the Federal Aviation Administration issued
a report noting that Stewart Airport, located only 55 miles from
New York City, had been declared surplus by the Department of
Defense. 8 The report indicated that the airport had the potential
of being developed as a major air carrier airport and freight facili-
ty and that its use could significantly relieve the congestion of the
"Am. Airlines v. Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1967), afl'd,
398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969).
"Allegheny Airlines v. Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956).
"See Vittek, Airport Noise Control-Can Communities Live Without It?
Can-Airlines Live With It?, 38 J. Am L. & COM. 473, 499 (1972).
' Id. at 490-91.
1" Id. at 492-94.
"e See Goldstein, Aircraft Noise and the Selection of Airport Sites, 43 PA. B.
Ass'N Q. 229, 233 (1972).
7 Id. at 233-35.
18 In denying an early motion for injunctive relief, the court quoted from the
FAA Task Force Report. Town of New Windsor v. Roman, 329 F. Supp. 1286,
1288-89 (1971).
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metropolitan area airports." While the present acreage was small,
the report noted that uninhabited land adjacent to the airport ap-
peared to be available for the requirements of an expanded facili-
ty.' Most importantly, the report indicated that the site represented
"one of the last viable opportunities for additional major airport
facilities in the area.""1
Stewart Airport had been built as a municipal airport for New-
burgh, New York, about 1930. In 1942, it became an Air Force
base and remained so until March of 1970, at which time the MTA
was permitted by the Department of Defense to lease and operate
a large portion of the base as a general aviation facility. In July
1970 the MTA acquired title to some 1,590 acres of the facility.
In April 1971 the New York Legislature passed, and in May 1971
amended, an act authorizing the establishment of an airport for
domestic and international air travel and freight transport at Stew-
art Airport."2 Under this act, the MTA was given the authority "to
establish, improve, maintain, reconstruct and operate"2 a general
aviation facility at Stewart Airport. Pursuant to this act, MTA
Chairman William J. Ronan announced the Authority's intention
to acquire approximately 9,000 acres of land to the west of Stewart
Airport. Plaintiffs' actions to halt the taking followed.
At the core of the plaintiffs' federal claims were two basic alle-
gations. The first was that the federal government had preempted
the field of airport development and expansion by requiring that
all airport development projects be subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Transportation. " The second was that the quantity and
quality of federal involvement had reached such significant propor-
tions as to constitute "federal action" within the contemplation of
NEPA, requiring the preparation of a detailed environmental im-
pact statement.2' Both of these claims rested on the provisions and
wording of the AADA.
The AADA was enacted to promote expansion and improve-
19 Id. at 1289.
20Id.
21 Id.
"See note I supra.
2Id.
13 Av. L. REP. at 17,367.
2Id.
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ment of the nation's airway and airport system." To achieve these
purposes, the AADA calls for the preparation of a National Air-
port System Plan to propose the type and estimated cost of airport
development necessary to provide an adequate system of public
airports. In support of this plan, the AADA authorizes two types
of grants: planning grants 8 and development grants." Planning
grants are provided to promote the effective location and develop-
ment of airports and the development of an adequate national air-
port system plan." Development grants are available for construct-
ing, improving or repairing a public airport, and for acquiring land
or easements for future airport development."' An application for
a development grant may not propose development not included
within the current revision of the National Airport System Plan."2
All proposed development must be in accordance with standards
established by the Secretary of Transportation.' No project may be
approved unless the agency making application holds good title to
the landing area of the airport or gives assurance that good title will
be acquired." No such qualifications are expressed with respect to
planning grants.
The AADA puts special emphasis on environmental concerns,
declaring as national policy that authorized airport development
projects shall provide for the protection and enhancement of
the natural resources and the quality of the national environment.'
The legislative history of the AADA reflects this concern, recog-
nizing that a "special effort" must be made to achieve compatibili-
ty with environmental quality.' While recognizing that some con-
flicts are inevitable between the need for developing essential avi-
2749 U.S.C. § 1701 (1970).
2749 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973).
2849 U.S.C. § 1713 (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973).2949 U.S.C. § 1714 (1970), as amended, (Supp. 111, 1973).
3049 U.S.C. § 1713(a) (1970).
3149 U.S.C. § 1711(2) (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973).
3249 U.S.C. § 1716(a) (1970).
" Id. Among other things, these standards govern site location, airport layout,
lighting, and approach safety.
49 U.S.C. § 1716(c)(1) (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973).
549 U.S.C. S 1716(c)(4) (1970).
6 H.R. REP. No. 601, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1969), as contained in U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3047, 3057.
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ation facilities and preservation of the nation's natural resources,
Congress has indicated its belief that with "suitable care" a "sound
balance" can be achieved.
This "sound balance" ostensibly involves a balancing of the fed-
eral interest in environmental protection against the federal inter-
est in developing essential aviation facilities. In practice, the balanc-
ing process must also consider the state interest in controlling its
environment and developing its airport and airway facilities in its
own manner. In New Windsor, the balancing process required a
recognition of the substantial state interest in taking land for con-
templated airport expansion. If the AADA preempted the field of
airport expansion and development, then state activity could not
proceed without approval of the Secretary of Transportation. If the
AADA did not preempt the field but the level of federal partici-
pation had reached such proportion as to constitute major federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment,
then the state activity could not proceed until a detailed environ-
mental impact statement had been prepared. Either of these would
constitute "federalization" of the airport expansion project. Absent
such federalization, the state interest would prevail.
In considering the first possible basis for federalization, the court
in New Windsor held that the AADA did not preempt the field of
airport expansion and development but acted only interstitially
against the background of the total corpus juris of the state law.
Plaintiffs had based their claim on specific language of the AADA
which provides that "(a)ll airport development projects shall be
subject to the approval of the Secretary. . . ."' The court held that,
considered in the total context of the act, the reference to "all air-
port development projects" meant "all federally funded" airport de-
velopment projects.'
The court also rejected the contention that the quantity and
quality of federal involvement had already reached such significant
proportions as would invoke the requirements of NEPA. Plaintiffs
had based this contention on three major factors:' (1) that FAA
37 Id.
8 3 Av. L. REP. at 17,368.
949 U.S.C. 5 1716(c)(1), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973).
40 3 Av. L. REP. at 17,368.
41 Id.
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approval was required for airport alterations; (2) that the state had
received a federal planning grant as authorized by the AADA; and
(3) that development of the proposed airport would inevitably re-
quire federal approval.
FAA approval over alterations to Stewart Airport had been up-
held in related litigation concerning the deed by which title to the
airport had been transferred from the Department of Defense to
the MTA.' In rejecting this FAA approval as an adequate ground
for federalization, the court relied on Boston v. Volpe."3 In that case,
the city of Boston attempted to enjoin the Massachusetts Port Au-
thority from continuing construction of the Outer Taxiway at
Logan International Airport pending decision on the merits of
Boston's claim that the Authority had not complied with certain
federal statutes and regulations. The issue was whether the tenta-
tive allocation of development funds under the AADA had so feder-
alized the expansion project as to require a halt to construction un-
til a satisfactory environmental impact statement had been issued.
The court in Boston v. Volpe rejected the proposition that federal
participation in a development forever federalizes the development."
Following Boston v. Volpe, the New Windsor court rejected plain-
tiffs' argument that the requirement of FAA approval for airport al-
terations federalized the airport expansion project at Stewart Air-
port. The court characterized the alterations as something less than
major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment.'
The court in Boston v. Volpe had noted that orders of the De-
partment of Transportation (DOT) specifically defined "federal
actions" as including approval of state highway programs but did
not mention tentative allocations of funds for airport development."
Therefore, the arguments that airport-aid and highway-aid were
analogous and that the tentative allocation of development funds
federalized the airport expansion project were rejected in Boston v.
Volpe." The court in New Windsor rejected a similar argument that
I Town of New Windsor v. Ronan, 12 Av. Cas. 5 17,787 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
aff'd, 481 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1973).
43464 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1972).
4Id. at 258.
" 3 Av. L. REp. at 17,368.
4464 F.2d at 259.
47 Id.
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the state's receipt of a planning grant under the AADA federalized
the project. 8 The justification for the distinction between highway-
aid and airport-aid is that highway development is carried out in a
number of discrete stages with federal approval necessary at each
stage." This highway development requires the identification of each
state's "system," the location of particular highways within a sys-
tem, and then the designing, planning, and construction of each
new highway." With airport development, only a single funding
decision is contemplated." Hence, the reasoning runs, in order to
ensure highway development properly consistent with federal en-
vironmental policies, federalization must occur early in the pro-
cess. Since state compliance with federal policies in airport-aid sit-
uations may be evaluated at the time approval for development
funds is sought, however, federalization need not occur prior to that
time.
The distinction between highway-aid and airport-aid drawn by
the courts in Boston v. Volpe and New Windsor is an imperfect one.
If, in fact, federal participation does not "forever federalize" a proj-
ect, then it would seem that funding must necessarily be carried out
in a number of discrete stages with federal approval necessary at
each stage, paralleling the highway-aid situation. The distinction has
also been criticized as ignoring the policy of NEPA which is to
apply safeguards before deleterious effects on the environment have
occurred." The statement of the court in La Raza Unida v. Volpe,"
the case most cited for the principle that federalization of a highway
project occurs at an early stage, is particularly pertinent:
The state should not have the considerable benefits that accompany
an option to obtain federal funds without also assuming the atten-
dant obligations. Any project that seeks even the possible protec-
tion and assistance of the federal government must fall within the
statutes and regulations.'
The distinction between highway-aid and airport-aid leads to an
48 3 Av. L. REP. at 17,369.
49 464 F.2d at 258.
0Id.
81 Id. at 259.
"Note, 39 J. AIR L. & COM. 121, 124 (1973).
"337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Cal. 1971), afl'd, 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973).
'4 337 F. Supp. at 227.
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unexpected and unfortunate result. In the case of highway-aid, loca-
tion approval is sufficient to federalize a project.' But in the case
of airport-aid, the location has already been selected at the time
development funds are sought. This is because the AADA requires
that the state have title to the land to be used, or at least give satis-
factory assurance that good title will be acquired, before receiving
approval of the development aid."' If a state does not contemplate
the use of federal development funds until late in the project, or
fails by intent or mistake to meet AADA requirements, the Secre-
tary of Transportation must, in his discretion, determine what a
"sound balance" requires. But if a state does not contemplate the
use of federal development funds at all, the result of the holding of
New Windsor is that environmental quality is effectively removed
as a requirement in airport planning, except as the state may be
otherwise bound by state law.
Plaintiffs' final argument for federalization was that development
of the proposed airport would inevitably require federal funding
and approval. While admitting this likelihood, the court rejected
the inevitableness of it, noting that the state, if it wished, could go
forward without federal funding.' The court recognized that this
meant few, if any, of the environmental requirements of the AADA
or NEPA would be mandated. It termed the result "unsatisfactory"
and "a function of a curious mixture of federalism and/or poor
legislative drafting."'" While wishing the result were otherwise, the
court concluded that it was without authority to direct the manner
in which the airport activity proceeded, absent a showing of more
tangible federal involvement."
It is not clear that the holding of New Windsor was compelled.
Since a DOT order published just three weeks before the court's
decision specifically excluded planning grants which do not imply a
project commitment from the meaning of "major federal action," ''
the court could not have held that the mere receipt of a planning
grant by itself required the preparation of an environmental impact
5Id.
5649 U.S.C. § 1716(c)(1) (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973).
57 3 Av. L. REP. at 17,369.
58 Id.
1"DOT Order 5610.IB, 39 Fed. Reg. 35235, 35237 (1974).
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statement. But the court might have found from all the facts and
circumstances of the case that the level of federal participation had
reached a level constituting "major federal action" and that an en-
vironmental impact statement should have been prepared prior to
the acquisition of land for airport expansion. The court might have
determined that the present potential for future development fund-
ing had become so great that it constituted a present reality. The
court might also have found that the environmental policy expressed
in the AADA went beyond the bounds of the section requiring ap-
proval of the Secretary for release of development funds. The policy
is, after all, a national policy, expressed with regard to "projects."
These projects must be planned and the planning must be funded.
The court did not have to follow the reasoning of Boston v. Volpe
in rejecting an analogy to highway-aid. This is particularly evident
in light of currently proposed revisions to DOT orders which spe-
cifically define tentative approval of new major development, in-
cluding runway expansion, as constituting "action" within the
meaning of NEPA."' It is very possible that if the currently proposed
regulations were in effect at the time, the court in Boston v. Volpe
might have found the highway-aid analogy more compelling.
The real problem is with the AADA itself. It purports to define
and support a national policy of protecting the nation's environ-
ment. Yet the manner in which funds are made available under the
Act can lead to a result entirely opposite to the claimed policy. A
state is forced under the Act to secure land before it has obtained
approval for development funds. If, for whatever reason, the land
obtained is not well-suited for the intended development, a heavy
burden is placed on the Secretary, or the courts, to balance the sub-
stantial state and federal interests involved. The AADA should not
direct the states to proceed in a manner which leads to a potential
confrontation of interests. What should be required under the
AADA is a three-step process. First, the granting of planning funds
should permit the state to determine the extent and location of new
land required for airport development or expansion. Secondly, fed-
eral approval of site location should be determined before the state
expends funds to acquire the land, at least in those instances in
which the state has no other reason to acquire the land. In analogy
" 40 Fed. Reg. 36516, 36519 (1975).
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to highway-aid, tentative federal approval at this stage would be
considered "major federal action" for purposes of NEPA, and ne-
cessary environmental statements would be prepared. Lastly, devel-
opment funds should be released upon a showing that the land has
been secured and provisions of the AADA, NEPA, and applicable
DOT regulations and procedures have been met. This process keeps
the basic purpose and structure of the AADA intact, invokes NEPA
safeguards for appropriate projects, and avoids the confrontation
problems presented by New Windsor. This approach to the planning
of large-scale airport development and expansion projects might
well reduce the fears of surrounding communities since federal en-
vironmental safeguards would be applicable throughout the plan-
ning process. In particular, since federal environmental policy re-
quires that fair consideration be given to the interests of communi-
ties in or near a potential project," it is possible that the situation in
New Windsor might have been avoided completely.
William Merritt
e249 U.S.C. S 1716(c)(3) (1970).
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